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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of conspiracy, according to Justice Robert Jackson, ex-
emplifies the "'tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of
its logic.' "" This same phenomenon is present today in the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO).2 RICO has
moved beyond logic and intent into areas far removed from racketeer-
ing. Originally intended to combat organized crime, RICO is used in-
creasingly in ideological disputes. For example, it has been used against
abortion clinic protestors and antipornography groups.
This Article argues that using RICO in ideological disputes is inap-
propriate and harmful because it results in the chilling of first amend-
ment rights. Indeed, it argues that RICO threatens civil liberties.3 Part
II of the Article describes the legislative history of RICO, shows the
intention of Congress to use RICO against organized crime involvement
in economic endeavors, and argues that RICO was not meant to encom-
pass noneconomic crimes. Part III examines the key statutory provi-
sions of RICO and the Supreme Court's interpretation of these terms
that expands RICO's intended scope. Part IV discusses RICO's predi-
cate acts. After a brief description of techniques used by antiabortion
organizations to publicize their views, Part V determines which of these
methods the first amendment protects. Part VI reviews three illustra-
tive examples of "mixed" conduct and what happens when RICO
clashes with the first amendment. Part VII examines situations in
which there is "mixed" conduct, some conduct protected by the first
amendment, and some that is not, and how the Court has protected
against a chilling effect through use of the doctrines of void for vague-
ness and precision of regulation. Part VIII argues that RICO should not
apply to demonstrators on policy grounds. Part IX analyzes the RICO
reform proposals currently before Congress and makes some recommen-
dations for change. Part X concludes that RICO should include an ex-
emption for advocacy activity.
1. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting B
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988)) [hereinafter RICO].
3. In 1970 Senator John C. McClellan, a principal sponsor of RICO, wrote a law review arti-
cle contending that RICO was not a threat to civil liberties, and castigating the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York for opposing the bill. See
McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46
NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Introduction of the Bill
Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Criminal Law and
Procedures Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, intro-
duced the Senate bill that became the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 (OCCA)4 on January 15, 1969. RICO was title IX of the OCCA.
The OCCA contained twelve titles authorizing various special weapons
for use against crime. The only party that could pursue civil remedies
was the government. At the time of introduction, Senate Bill 30 did not
contain a private right of action.
Various national commissions such as the Kefauver, Katzenbach,
McClellan, and Brown Commissions had examined the economic activi-
ties of organized crime. Their findings highlighted the frustrating
problems of controlling organized crime and organized crime's partici-
pation in legitimate businesses." Money was considered to be the key to
power in the underworld.'
In passing the OCCA, Congress clearly focused on organized crime.
More specifically, Congress was attempting to stop infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses. By stopping this infiltration, Congress felt it could
strike at the "heart" of organized crime-money. The economic base of
organized crime was thought to be impervious to old methods of crime-
fighting. RICO's new weapons never before had been applied to crimi-
nal defendants and were aimed at destroying organized crime's eco-
nomic base.
In introducing Senate Bill 30, Senator McClellan stated that the
4. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter OCCA]. The Senate bill number was S. 30. See S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115 CONG.
REC. S279 (1969).
5. The former chief counsel to the Senate Criminal Law and Procedures Subcommittee, Pro-
fessor G. Robert Blakey traced the origins of the organized crime problem that RICO was meant to
solve. Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 237, 249 (1982).
6. The direct intellectual antecedent of the RICO provision was the Katzenbach Report,
which specified how organized crime acquires interests in legitimate businesses. REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT]; see also Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal (pts. 1 & 2), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661, 670 (1987). "Control of business concerns has usually
been acquired through one of four methods: (1) investing concealed profits acquired from gambling
and other illegal activities; (2) accepting business interests in payment of the owner's gambling
debts; (3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and (4) using various forms of extortion." COMM'N REPORT,
supra, at 190.
These methods form the basis of what RICO prohibits. For example, § 1962 lists four prohib-
ited activities: (a) investing illegal proceeds in a legitimate business; (b) acquiring an interest in a
legitimate business through a pattern of racketeering activity; (c) participating or conducting the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; and (d) conspiracy to commit
(a), (b), or (c). See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
1990]
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twenty-four Cosa Nostra groups were the power base of organized
crime.7 The Senator stated that organized crime used illegal money and
violence to infiltrate legitimate business and labor unions., Later
speeches by the Senator in support of the legislation reemphasized this
economic theme."
Later in March of 1969, Senator McClellan and Senator Roman L.
Hruska, the ranking Republican on the Subcommittee, introduced
other bills aimed specifically at the infiltration of business by organized
crime. Senator Hruska introduced Senate Bill 1623, which prohibited
investment of "ill gotten gains"1 and allowed private treble damage ac-
tions by businessmen who had been damaged by unfair competition by
a "racketeer businessman."'1 In April 1969, Senator McClellan intro-
duced Senate Bill 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act, for himself and
Senator Hruska. This Bill proved to be RICO's predecessor.12
This legislation combined elements of both Senate Bills 30 and
1623. Senate Bill 1861 used the same economic rationales for its neces-
sity as Senate Bill 30,"S specifically the threat to the economy posed by
organized crime. The Bill was "designed to attack the infiltration of le-
gitimate business .. ."I" It also set forth the forbidden activities,
namely to acquire, control, or operate organizations by the use of a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.15
During its deliberations, the Senate Subcommittee incorporated
Senate Bill 1861 in title IX of Senate Bill 30, popularly known as RICO.
On December 18, 1969, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported on
7. 115 CONG. REC. 827 (1969).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 5874. Senator McClellan stated that "[organized crime] now dominates the
fields of jukebox and vending machine distribution. Laundry services, liquor and beer distribution,
nightclubs, food wholesaling, record manufacturing, the garment industry and a host of other legit-
imate lines of endeavor have been invaded and taken over." Quoting directly from the Katzenbach
Report, the Senator added: "Control of business concerns has been acquired by the sub-rosa in-
vestment of profits acquired from illegal ventures, accepting business interests in payment of gam-
bling or loan shark debts, but, most often, by various forms of extortion." Id. He went on to state
that "[w]ith its extensive infiltration of legitimate business, organized crime thus poses a new
threat to the American economic system. .. . When organized crime moves into a business, it
usually brings to that venture all the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in its
illegal businesses." Id.
10. See id. at 6992. This provision later became § 1962(a), part of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a) (1988).
11. 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969).
12. Id. at 956; see also A.BA. SECTION OF CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD
Hoc CiviL RICO TASK FORCE 88 (1985) [hereinafter ABA RICO REPORT].
13. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
14. 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969).
15. Id. Thus, S. 1861 contained the prohibitions in § 1962(b) and § 1962(c). See 18 U.S.C. §
1962(b), (c) (1988). S. 1623 foreshadowed § 1962(a). See id. § 1962(a). These two Bills eventually
became title IX of the OCCA, RICO.
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the OCCA.'6 The Statement of Findings and Purpose revealed the
Committee's intent to find new ways of combatting organized crime for
economic reasons. 17 Organized crime allegedly drained billions of dollars
from the economy through illegal acts, such as gambling, loan-sharking,
and sale of narcotics.' 8 Further, organized crime drew its power from
money obtained through social exploitation. 9 This money and power
were used increasingly to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and
unions.20 Organized crime activities were claimed to "weaken the stabil-
ity of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and com-
peting organizations, interfere with free competition, [and] seriously
burden interstate and foreign commerce."'" The purpose of the Act was
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by es-
tablishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged
in organized crime. '2 2 It is important to note, however, that the Find-
ings of Fact contain no mention of noneconomic crime.23
In the Section by Section Analysis portion of its Report, the Com-
mittee reiterated that the purpose of RICO was to eliminate the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organi-
zations.24 New methods were needed to combat organized crime because
16. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
17. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 16, at 1. The Report stated:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized
crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeav-
ors [sic] as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the impor-
tation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legiti-
mate business and labor unions ....
Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2.
23. One commentator defines noneconomic crime as follows:
The term "noneconomic" is used to describe those persons who not only have no com-
mercial interest-i.e., profit-but who also have no prospect of economic gain from their an-
ticompetitive actions. Thus, labor unions or members of professional associations, while not
business competitors, may have an economic interest in constraining their target's ability to
compete.
Note, The Scope of Noerr Immunity for Direct Action Protestors: Antitrust Meets the Anti-Abor-
tionists, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 669 n.47 (1989) (citing Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose As a
Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705, 712-13 (1962)).
24. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 16, at 76.
1990]
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not a single mob "family" had been destroyed using traditional meth-
ods of criminal prosecution.25 Old methods were inadequate because
imprisonment did not reach the source of the mob's power-money.26
The Report concluded that it was important "to do all that is nec-
essary to free the channels of commerce from all illicit activity" 27 be-
cause organized crime threatened the existence of the free enterprise
system.28 Again, however, the Senate Committee Report makes no men-
tion of using RICO against noneconomic defendants.29
B. Senate Debate
During the three days of Senate debate, Senator McClellan and
Senator Hruska continued to examine the economic theme of organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate business.30 Senator McClellan stated
that of the "113 major organized crime figures, 98 are involved in 159
businesses."31 Senator McClellan also maintained that the mob con-
trolled one of the largest hotel chains in the country, dominated a bank
with assets in excess of seven million dollars, and operated a twenty
million dollar laundry, among other enterprises.3 2
Senator Hruska stressed that the RICO provisions were a novel,
promising, and ingenious proposal for crippling organized crime's rela-
tively recent, but spectacularly successful emergence into the field of
legitimate business and unions.3 Both of the chief sponsors of the
RICO legislation stressed that the Bill was meant to fight infiltration of
25. See id. at 78.
26. See id. at 79. The Report stated:
What is needed here. . . are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also
with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to
the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of
economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 80-81. The Report stated:
There is no doubt that the common law criminal trial, hedged in as it is by necessary restric-
tions on arbitrary governmental power to protect individual rights, is a relatively ineffectual
tool to implement economic policy. It must be frankly recognized, moreover, that the infiltra-
tion of legitimate organizations by organized crime presents more than a problem in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. What is ultimately at stake is not only the security of
individuals and their property, but also the viability of our free enterprise system itself.
Id.
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. See 116 CONG. REc. 585 (1970) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan).
31. Id. at 592. Supporters of RICO in both Houses repeatedly used these statistics. Senator
Hruska also used these statistics in hearings on Jan. 21, 1970. See id. at 602.
32. Id. at 592. Senator McClellan referred to an alphabetical list of businesses in which or-
ganized crime has been active. The list contains 85 businesses from accounting to wire service, and
includes the business of "picnic groves." Id.
33. Id. at 602.
[Vol. 43:805810
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business by organized crime.34
The legislation's key definition of "racketeering activity" specifi-
cally included "those crimes most often associated with organized
crime, especially those associated with the infiltration of legitimate or-
ganizations," namely "murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, narcotic violations, counterfeiting, usury, mail fraud,
bankruptcy fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud, and obstruction of
justice. '35 At the point of Senate passage, the Bill still did not contain a
private treble damages remedy. The Bill allowed only the government
to sue for civil damages and equitable relief.3
C. House Consideration
Consideration of an organized crime bill in the House began in the
Judiciary Committee in May 1970. On the first day of hearings, the
principal House sponsor, Representative Richard H. Poff, defined or-
ganized crime in terms of economic motivation.37 Senator McClellan, as
the first witness to appear before the House, summarized RICO by de-
fining racketeering activity in terms of the criminal statutes characteris-
tically violated by participants in organized crime.38 He stated that
RICO was designed to prevent organized criminals from infiltrating le-
gitimate commercial organizations with the proceeds of their criminal
34. Senator McClellan limited the definition of organized crime. This limitation became clear
in a colloquy on title X, which involved enhanced sentences for repeat offenders. Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, concerned that the statute would sentence minor or technical repeat offenders to
long prison terms offered an amendment that would have enhanced sentences only for those con-
victed of crimes listed in title IX, serious "racketeering type" offenses. Senator Kennedy argued
that if his amendment was rejected, offenders like Dr. Benjamin Spock, who had been charged
with conspiracy to violate the selective service laws, might be subjected to repeat offender
sentences. Senator McClellan answered, in part, as follows: "What he is supposed to have done
would not normally be considered organized crime. It is certainly different from what those people
do who perpetrate heinous crimes and live on the fruits of crime." Id. at 846.
The question of what kind of criminal was a member of organized crime also would arise in
the House. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
35. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 16, at 158.
36. ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 12, at 106. RICO passed the Senate on Jan. 23, 1970. 116
CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
37. Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings]. The Hearings determined
that
organized crime . . . was defined as a self-perpetuating, continuing, criminal conspiracy, the
goal of which is to gather profits and power, utilizing fear and corruption and seeking to
obtain an immunity from the law.
... [C]rime can be categorized in two major compartments: One, organized crime; and
the other, disorganized crime . . . . [T]here is a demonstrable nexus between the two com-
partments of crime. Organized crime and its machinations have been and will continue to be
the seedbed of disorganized crime, street crime, muggings and the like.
38. See id. at 85.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
activities or with violent and corrupt methods of operation. 9
On June 17, 1970, Representative Sam Steiger of Arizona, in a let-
ter to the Committee, proposed amending RICO to provide a treble
damages private right of action, similar to a provision in the Clayton
Act.40 The ABA also proposed adding a private right of action modeled
on the Clayton Act and allowing treble damages.41 Both the ABA and
Steiger proposals concerned economic factors, not ideological disputes.
In September of 1970 the entire House Judiciary Committee favor-
ably reported Senate Bill 30 with amendments to the House.42 One of
the amendments was the treble damages private right of action. An-
other important amendment related to control of explosives.43 This
amendment, which became title XI of the OCCA, initiated new licens-
ing requirements for users of explosives, enhanced penalties for inten-
tional misuse of explosives, and made it a criminal violation to bomb
federal property and the property of recipients of federal financial as-
sistance such as universities, hospitals, and police stations.44 Title XI
provided for capital punishment if the bombing resulted in death. The
Committee underscored the need for explosives control as follows:
"Bombings and the threat of bombings have become an ugly, recurrent
incident of life in cities and on campuses throughout our Nation. The
absence of any effective [s]tate or local controls clearly attest[s] to the
urgent need to enact strengthened [f]ederal regulation of explosives. '' 45
Because the bombing crimes were part of the same law as RICO, it
would have been natural to make bombing a RICO predicate act if the
39. Id. at 106. To support the proposition that S. 30 was urgently needed, Senator McClellan
again used the familiar survey results which showed that of 113 major criminal figures, 98 were
involved in 159 businesses, including hotels, banks, and laundries. See supra notes 31-32 and ac-
companying text. The Senator advocated passage of RICO on economic terms. See House Hear-
ings, supra note 37, at 106. Similarly, Attorney General John Mitchell supported RICO because it
"will enable us to use the full panoply of weapons available under the antitrust laws to attack the
'property' of organized crime, and to protect legitimate businesses against the syndicates' infiltra-
tion." Id. at 157.
Additionally Attorney General Mitchell stated that "[tihe proposal appears to cover most of
the methods through which La Cosa Nostra customarily infiltrates and operates legitimate busi-
ness enterprises." Id. at 170.
40. House Hearings, supra note 37, at 520. Representative Steiger specifically stated, "Not
every businessman . . . will wish to take advantage of such a remedy, but those who have been
wronged by organized crime should at least be given access to a legal remedy." Id.
41. Id. at 543-44. Apart from the written statements of Representative Steiger and the ABA,
the hearing record contains no further consideration of the treble damages private right of action.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4012.
43. Id. at 24, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4013.
44. Id. at 28, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4013-14; see also OCCA,
supra note 4, tit. XI, 84 Stat. at 952.
45. H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 42, at 37, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4013.
812 [Vol. 43:805
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purpose of RICO were to punish heinous or outrageous crimes. RICO,
however, was aimed at economically motivated crime committed by
members of organized crime." Bombing, in contrast, was political, and
disorganized crime. The bombing that concerned Congress was done by
opponents of the Vietnam conflict and urban radicals.7 Title XI crimes
were not made RICO predicate acts, and several members of the House
elaborated on the reasons behind the distinction.4' Thus, Congress
clearly indicated RICO's intent was to curb organized crime engaged in
for profit. It dealt with the pressing noneconomic crime of terrorist
bombings in a separate title of the OCCA.
Any reach of RICO beyond organized crime was incidental at
best.49 Even this incidental reach, however, was limited by an economic
factor. The failure to include bombing as a RICO predicate shows that
violence with no economic motivation or purpose was not meant to be
within either the direct or incidental reach of RICO. People who en-
gaged in bombing were hot-headed anarchists, not the cool-headed bus-
inessmen of crime.50 There is no indication that Congress intended
RICO to reach noneconomic crimes. Indeed, the inclusion of bombing in
46. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Senator McClellan said that organized crime
was heinous and for profit.
47. 116 CONG. REC. 35,319 (1970) (remarks of Rep. William Roth).
48. During floor debate Representative Fernand J. St. Germain explained the reason:
The House version of Senate Bill 30 contains a new Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, which
is an antibombing rather than an antiorganized crime law.. . . Hopefully, a major effect of
this legislation will be to deter both the cold-blooded businessmen of crime and hot-headed
anarchists from further activity.
Id. at 35,200. Representative Richard H. Poff, the chief House sponsor of the Bill, also stressed the
differences between bombing and organized crime:
The bill contains 13 titles. These can be classified in 5 operative categories-evidence, gam-
bling, racketeer organizations, special offender sentencing, and explosives . . . . The fifth op-
erative category concerning explosives, found in title XI, is not restricted to organized crime.
It is prompted by the national emergency of criminal bombings brought into dramatic focus
by the recent tragedy at the University of Wisconsin.
Id. at 35,200-01. Representative Broomfield said that the bombings were "an area unrelated to
organized crime." Id. at 35,312. Another congressman noted the political character of bombings:
Student disorders have become a concern for all of us. The activities of a small group of
activists are jeopardizing the safety and education of the majority of students. . . . The use
of bombs and bombings as a tool of demonstration has instead become a tool of death, as
witnessed at the University of Wisconsin.
Id. at 35,206 (statement of Rep. Donald D. Clancy).
49. Id. at 35,344 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff). The incidental reach of RICO was
inevitable because Congress did not want to pass an unconstitutional law based on status (mem-
bership in the Mafia). See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Therefore, Congress had to define organized crime indirectly: function-
ally by what people did, not by who they were. The functional definition brought in, secondarily,
people who were not members of organized crime but who engaged in activities characteristic of
organized crime. See ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 12, at 90.
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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the OCCA, but not as a RICO predicate, strongly indicates that crimes
not undertaken for profit were not meant to be covered by RICO.5 1
III. THE RICO STATUTE
RICO is both a criminal and a civil statute. In trying to forge an
effective weapon against organized crime in civil RICO, Congress tilted
the adversarial scales toward the plaintiff.52
A. Advantages of RICO for Plaintiff
Civil RICO has several advantages over criminal law. No indict-
ment is necessary before a plaintiff brings an action under the civil pro-
visions of RICO. No prosecutorial discretion is required. To prevail in a
civil RICO action, plaintiffs must prove their claims by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a certainly less demanding level of proof than
"clear and convincing" or the normal criminal standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt."53 RICO denies the defendant criminal law's height-
ened burden of proof and its procedural protections. 4 For example, the
51. The OCCA, with the addition of a bombing title and a treble damages private right of
action under the RICO title, was passed by the House on Oct. 7, 1970. See 116 CoNG. REc. 35,363
(1970). The Bill was sent to the Senate where Senator McClellan, characterizing the House amend-
ments, including the private right of action, as relatively minor, argued that a conference would be
too time consuming and urged the Senate to pass the House version of the Bill. Id. at 36,295. The
Senate passed the Bill, and President Richard M. Nixon signed it three days later on Oct. 15, 1970.
See OCCA, supra note 4, 84 Stat. at 922.
Justice Thurgood Marshall summarized the legislative history of RICO as follows:
Moreover, if Congress had intended to bring about dramatic changes in the nature of
commercial litigation, it would at least have paid more than cursory attention to the civil
RICO provision. This provision was added in the House of Representatives after the Senate
already had passed its version of the RICO bill; the House itself adopted a civil remedy provi-
sion almost as an afterthought; and the Senate thereafter accepted the House's version of the
bill without even requesting a Conference. Congress simply does not act in this way when it
intends to effect fundamental changes in the structure of federal law.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 507 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
52. See Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter H.R. 1046 Hearings] (hearings not officially
printed as of current date) (statement of Jed S. Rakoff). Mr. Rakoff stated:
RICO does this, primarily, by permitting huge and disproportionate penalties to be predi-
cated upon frequently trivial offenses. For example, on the civil side, it is well known that
even minor deviations from the most upright business conduct can satisfy the technical ele-
ments of the expansive federal mail and wire fraud statutes and thus form the predicate for
private RICO actions demanding huge monetary damages. On the criminal side, the forfeiture
and pre-trial seizure provisions of RICO can effectively deprive a defendant not only of his
counsel of choice but of the means to fund any effective defense.
Id.
53. See CRIMINAL Div., U.S, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECU-
TORS 16 (1988) [hereinafter CivIL RICO MANUAL].
54. Id. at 17.
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pleading requirements under civil RICO are more liberal than a crimi-
nal law indictment.5 5 Also, if a civil RICO defendant invokes the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a negative inference
may be drawn at trial.5 6 Furthermore, civil RICO does not require a
conviction of the underlying predicate activities.
The RICO statute makes four types of conduct unlawful and sub-
ject to civil RICO. Generally, it is unlawful to: (a) use or invest income
derived from a pattern of racketeering to acquire an interest in an en-
terprise; (b) acquire or maintain an interest in any enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity; (c) conduct or participate in the affairs
of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; or (d) con-
spire to violate any of the foregoing provisions.57 The vast majority of
both civil and criminal RICO cases involve (c) and (d), above.58
To prove a violation of section 1962(c), the most commonly used
provision, the following elements must be shown: (1) that an enterprise
exists; (2) that the enterprise affected interstate commerce; (3) that the
defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that
the defendant participated either directly or indirectly in the conduct
of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that the defendant participated
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 9 The statute defines pattern
of racketeering activity as the commission of at least two racketeering
acts.60
B. Court Interpretation of Key Statutory Terms
Legislative history shows that Congress meant to limit the applica-
bility of RICO by using the terms "enterprise," "pattern," and "racke-
teering activity."6 " Courts, however, have interpreted these terms so
expansively that their limitation is slight.6 2
55. Id.
56. Id. at 18.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
58. See H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 52 (statement of Prof. Gerard E. Lynch).
59. See United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
61. ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 12, at 71-72. Also, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
Justice Thurgood Marshall concluded:
The statutory language and legislative history support the view that Congress did not
intend to effect a radical alteration of federal civil litigation. In fact, the language and history
indicate a congressional intention to limit, in a workable and coherent manner, the type of
injury that is compensable under the civil RICO provision .... Congress sought to fill an
existing gap in civil remedies and to provide a means of compensation that otherwise did not
exist for the honest businessman harmed by the economic power of "racketeers."
473 U.S. 479, 508 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989) (for "pat-
tern"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 (for "racketeering injury"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
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The Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to limit RICO to
its intended scope and has declined repeatedly to do so. In each case
RICO has been interpreted expansively, and these decisions have dis-
couraged lower courts from limiting RICO. The High Court has inter-
preted the key statutory terms "enterprise," "racketeering activity,"
and "pattern" in a way that greatly expands the applicability of RICO,
instead of narrowing it. Coupled with the expansion of mail and wire
fraud and extortion as RICO predicates, 3 situations far removed from
those envisioned by Congress in 1970 now fall within RICO's ambitt4 If
576, 587 (1981) (for "enterprise").
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988); see Fasman, The Proper Application of Civil RICO to
Patent Fraud, 96 YALE L.J. 1323, 1325 (1987).
64. In Turkette the Court was presented with the question of what kind of enterprise was
covered by RICO. The circuits had been split on the question of whether exclusively criminal
groups were covered by the statutory definition of enterprise. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581-85.
The Turkette Court held that both legitimate and criminal enterprises were covered. Id. at 587.
The Court began its analysis by stating the rule of statutory construction, that when the
meaning of the statute's words is clear, the statutory language is conclusive. Id. at 580. The Court
noted that:
It]he "enterprise" is defined as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition:
an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the
definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988)). Sedima involved two corporations that
had been partners in a joint venture. One corporation claimed that the other had unjustly enriched
itself by overbilling-a fairly typical commercial dispute. Plaintiff corporation, however, alleged
mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to violate RICO. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 484. The Second Circuit
had held that the plaintiff had not shown the requisite "racketeering type" injury under RICO. Id.
at 485. The Supreme Court, however, declined to limit the statute's scope, and urged lower courts
to interpret RICO literally and to refrain from imposing limits on the statute. Id. at 495. It re-
versed the Second Circuit, giving the statutory terms racketeering activity and injury an expansive
reading. Id. at 500. The Court held:
If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these
provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the
plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an addi-
tional, amorphous "racketeering injury" requirement.
Id. at 495.
Voicing recognition that RICO, in its private civil version, has evolved into something mani-
festly askew from the original conception of its creators, the Court nevertheless deferred to the
wisdom of Congress to correct the statutory inadequacies. Id. at 499-500. The Court opined that
"this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with
Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has
provided it.. . ." Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall examined the legislative history carefully and
found that RICO was intended to focus on organized crime, not on commercial disputes. See supra
note 61.
With Turkette defining enterprise to mean almost anything and Sedima defining pattern of
racketeering activity to mean a violation of the predicate acts, only the key statutory definition of
"pattern" remained. The Supreme Court addressed the pattern definition in H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct.
at 2893.
The Court started with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordi-
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two people commit, attempt, or conspire to commit at least two predi-
cate acts within ten years, RICO applies.65
In Turkette, Sedima, and H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court declined to
interpret the legislative history to limit the meaning of the OCCA or to
narrow RICO. Because the Court has not been faced with noneconomic
defendants, the question of whether noneconomic defendants are sub-
ject to RICO still must be considered open. Nevertheless, the general
unwillingness to look at legislative history, the reliance on the plain
meaning of the terms of the statute, and the denial of certiorari in
Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle,66 do not inspire confidence
that the Court will hold that RICO does not apply to noneconomic
defendants.
IV. RICO PREDICATE ACTS
Under RICO the plaintiff must establish a "pattern" of "racketeer-
ing activity" that requires commission of, or conspiracy to commit, at
least two predicate crimes within a ten-year period .6  Racketeering ac-
tivity is any act listed in section 1961(1). Commission of two of these
crimes or one crime two times by a defendant constitutes a pattern and
RICO applies. The crimes are referred to as predicate acts, and RICO
has both federal and state predicates. Congress frequently has ex-
panded the number of predicate acts that trigger RICO applicability.6 8
nary meaning of the words used. In its ordinary meaning pattern means more than a multiplicity
of predicate acts. "A 'pattern' is an 'arrangement or order of things or activity.'" Id. at 2900 (quot-
ing 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989)). Looking at the legislative history, the Court
held that a prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related and that they
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Id. Continuity plus relationship equals
pattern. Id. The Court further defined the terms relationship and continuity. Relationship was
defined by reference to another part of the OCCA, title X, as "'criminal conduct forms a pattern if
it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events.'" Id. at 2901 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988)).
The Court could not define continuity by reference to contemporaneous legislation. It defined
continuity as both a "closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of re-
peated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of
repetition. It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept .. " Id. at 2902 (citation omitted).
Justice Antonin Scalia, in a concurring opinion, noted the great splits between the circuits
after Sedima as to the meaning of pattern. He stated that the majority formulation of "continuity
plus relationship" in H.J. Inc. would be about as helpful to lower courts as the phrase "life is a
fountain." Id. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. See generally Lynch, supra note 6, at 713-14.
66. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989); see infra note 107.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
68. In 1978 trafficking in contraband cigarettes was added. Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-575, § 2346, 92 Stat. 2463, 2465-66 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)). Also
in 1978 the term "bankruptcy fraud" was replaced by "fraud connected with a case under title 11."
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 151, 92 Stat. 2549, 2677 (codified as
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Predicate acts include such traditional organized crime activities as
murder and arson and nontraditional organized crimes such as mail and
wire fraud, and fraud in the sale of securities.69 Attempts and conspira-
cies to violate these laws can be pleaded as separate RICO predicates. 0
RICO also includes any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, ar-
son, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or
dealing in narcotics or dangerous drugs that is chargeable under state
law and is punishable by at least one year in prison.7 '
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)). Congress added any act indictable under the Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act in 1984. Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 5323,
98 Stat. 1838, 2136 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)). Congress also
added interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, trafficking in certain motor vehicles or
motor vehicle parts, Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-547, § 205,
98 Stat. 2754, 2770 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)), and laundering of
monetary instruments, and engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activities. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-
20 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)). Later in 1986 two more predicate acts
were added-tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant and retaliating against a witness,
victim, or an informant. Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-646, § 50, 100 Stat. 3592, 3605 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)). On
Nov. 18, 1988, Congress added use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-
for-hire, sexual exploitation of children, and fraud and related activity in connection with access
devices. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7054, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988)).
69. Hobbs Act extortion is a traditional activity of organized crime. Applicability has been
expanded greatly to include much activity outside the traditional parameters of extortion. See
infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
Even if the alleged criminal conduct is specifically covered by a law, like the False Claims Act,
or the securities law, it can be plead, and often is plead, under a more general RICO predicate, like
mail fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990 n.50 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
70. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO):
A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 73 (rev. ed. 1986) [hereinafter DOJ CRIMINAL MANUAL].
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988). A state offense may be charged as a RICO predicate even
if the defendant could not be tried in state court at the time of the RICO indictment. Indeed, prior
acquittal in state court does not bar use of the act as a RICO predicate. Attempts and conspiracies
to commit the generic state acts can be separate RICO charges. See United States v. Licavoli, 725
F.2d 1040, 1047 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
The penalties for RICO violations include fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture. The maximum
penalty for violation of any provision of § 1962 is imprisonment for 20 years, a fine under the
provisions of title 18, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). Furthermore, consecutive sentences for
violation of the substantive provisions and the conspiracy provision are allowed. See United States
v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); United States v.
Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
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Several of the predicate acts pose civil liberties problems in their
own right. The most prominent are extortion,72 mail and wire fraud,73
and obscenity. 74
72. Extortion is a federal predicate under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988). State
extortion laws that call for a maximum penalty of one year are also RICO predicates. These state
extortion laws vary greatly in what actions are criminalized. See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr, SUBSTAN-
TIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.12(a) (1986).
73. Because the language of the mail and wire fraud statutes are identical, they are analyzed
in the same way. See United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). To prove fraud, the common
law required an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact made with knowledge of its falsity
and with intent to deceive upon which another relied to his or her actual injury. W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 727-29 (5th ed. 1984).
Mail fraud is much easier to prove. "In general, and in its generic sense, fraud comprises all acts,
conduct, omissions and concealment involving breach of a legal or equitable duty and resulting in
damage to another." Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
818 (1962). The damage that must be shown may be intangible loss. A mail fraud based RICO
claim would be easy to make. The example is as follows: (1) The defendant recklessly failed to
state a fact that might have deceived someone;(2) in furtherance of this deception, the defendant
sent two mailings; and (3) this fraud injured plaintiff's business or property. Note that a RICO
civil recovery would require a showing of actual damage. See Fasman, supra note 63, at 1328. For
application of mail fraud to abortion clinic protesters, see infra notes 125-34 and accompanying
text.
The use of mail fraud as an omnibus criminal law to punish various types of behavior repug-
nant to the government has earned the statute much criticism. The Department of Justice has
suggested to federal prosecutors that they must be more selective in using tle mail fraud
predicate:
Because of legitimate concerns about the possible overuse of mail fraud to generate RICO
cases out of relatively minor conduct, some policy limitations have been imposed on its use as
a predicate offense. First, the use of mall fraud as a predicate is not generally encouraged,
particularly in cases where no other predicate crimes are charged, or where the conduct can
be more accurately charged under some other RICO predicate offense, such as a state bribery
statute.
DOJ CRIMINAL MANUAL, supra note 70, at 13. Civil plaintiffs, however, have no concern with
prosecutorial discretion, and have availed themselves of mail fraud's enormous reach. See infra
notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
74. Dealing in obscene materials was added as a RICO predicate act in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-
473, tit. II, §§ 901(g), 1020, 98 Stat. 2136, 2143 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(1)(B)
(1988)). There are serious civil liberties concerns with using obscenity as a RICO predicate act.
They are: (1) pretrial seizure of assets; and (2) posttrial seizure of assets. Seizing the assets of an
enterprise merely upon an indictment for a RICO violation is now widespread practice. See Coffee,
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Under RICO, Trials Have Become Secondary, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13,
1989, at 20, col. 1. An indictment is merely an accusation and is supposed to carry no burden of
guilt. The accused is presumed innocent, and the government bears the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. RICO turns that basic principle of American justice on its head. A
person is indicted and then, before trial, the defendant's assets are seized or frozen. When the
defendant is a person who sells material that is otherwise protected by the first amendment, pre-
trial seizure of assets can be a prior restraint. In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916
(1989), the Supreme Court held that seizure of all of a bookseller's stock on the grounds that some
of the books were obscene was a violation of the doctrine of prior restraint and of the first amend-
ment. Id. at 927-30. Also, preconviction seizure is especially problematic because it can affect the
right to hire an attorney. Title to property obtained as a result of a crime vests in the government
at the time of the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988). Thus, prior to commencement of a trial, a
prosecutor could obtain a restraining order that would deny defendants access to funds with which
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Mail fraud provides a good example of the combination of RICO's
comprehensive reach with an underlying predicate act that has been
expanding exponentially. This expansion has resulted in criminalizing
and harshly punishing conduct that would be lightly punishable at best
under state criminal law.", The Supreme Court narrowed the reach of
mail fraud in United States v. McNally, 6 but Congress passed legisla-
tion restoring mail fraud's original reach."
to defend themselves.
The issue of postconviction seizure has not been settled. Are booksellers to lose all of their
books because a few titles are obscene? If one store has some obscene material, will the defendant
forfeit his or her interest in all other stores? Do the same standards apply to businesses that sell
films or records? The bookseller or other defendant may be subject to two novel remedies author-
ized by RICO. The first permits forfeiture of interests obtained through violations of RICO, prop-
erty that gives the defendant a source of influence over the RICO enterprise and any direct or
indirect proceeds from the racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). For RICO's applica-
tion to obscenity, see Melnick, A "Peep" at RICO: Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana and the Applica-
tion of Anti-Racketeering Statutes to Obscenity Violations, 69 B.U.L. REv. 389 (1989).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980). Mandel involved a prosecution of the Governor of Maryland for racketeering. The
Governor had accepted money from owners of a racetrack and taken legislative positions that were
favorable to the racetrack owners. Id. at 1352-53. The government could not prove, and did not
have to prove, that there was a connection between the Governor's stand on the issues and receipt
of the money. All the government showed was that the Governor had failed to disclose to the
people of Maryland all material issues involving state government. This failure to disclose was held
to be a scheme to defraud the people. Id. at 1361-62. As the Court said: "[T]he mail fraud statute
generally has been available to prosecute a scheme involving deception that . . . is contrary to
public policy and conflicts with accepted standards of moral uprightness, fundamental honesty,
fair play and right dealing." Id. at 1361; see also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). In Margiotta the Second Circuit went further, upholding
the mall fraud conviction of a Republican Party county chairman who failed to disclose that he
had received money from brokers who did business with the county. The chairman used the money
for the party, not himself. Nevertheless, the court held that he had breached the fiduciary duty
that he owed the public. Margiotta's argument that he never knew that he was in a fiduciary
capacity with the public as a whole was not persuasive. Id. at 123-26.
Used as a predicate act of RICO, mail fraud is so broad that it punishes under a harsh federal
law conduct that the state has declined to criminalize. See United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352
(2d Cir. 1989). In Porcelli defendant filed false tax returns, neglecting to pay $5 million in state
sales tax. At the time Porcelli violated RICO, filing a false state sales tax return was not a felony.
The taxpayer most likely would be subject to a civil penalty. In amending the statute after the
false filings, the New York legislature declined to make false filing a felony. See id. at 1367 & n.1
(Newman, J., dissenting). The United States attorney prosecuted Porcelli under the mail fraud
statute. Each tax return was a separate violation, aggregating to a violation of RICO. Porcelli was
sentenced to prison, and because of the draconian forfeiture provisions of RICO, forfeited many
business interests, for a total loss of approximately $5 million. Id. at 1355.
The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, and stated:
[T]he prosecution of a state sales tax evader for a RICO violation pushes that law to its
outer limits, especially when that tax evasion was not made criminal by the state itself at the
time that the fraudulent returns were filed. We nevertheless affirm the convictions . . . by
virtue of the extraordinarily broad sweep of RICO and of the federal mail fraud statute ....
Id.
76. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
77. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988). The wire fraud statute prohibits the
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Like mail fraud, extortion is a rapidly expanding predicate act that
produces troubling results.18 For example, the Hobbs Act now covers
attempts to extort intangible property rights.1" Because rights involving
the conduct of business are property rights, any demonstration that in-
terrupts the normal conduct of business could lead to a RICO allegation
of extortion.80
V. FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEMS WITH RICO
A. Abortion Clinic Demonstrators and Their Methods
This section will describe some of the methods used by abortion
opponents in their activities. If antiabortion demonstrations cause loss
of tangible or intangible property, the demonstrators may be subject to
a RICO lawsuit. Antiabortion mailings also can lead to RICO lawsuits
because mail fraud is a RICO predicate, and mail fraud can be shown
by proving deception that causes loss. This section will examine
whether such words and deeds are protected by the first amendment,
whether these words and deeds violate RICO, and whether the applica-
tion of RICO to abortion clinic demonstrators violates or impinges upon
first amendment rights.
use of interstate wires for the purpose of executing "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
Until the Supreme Court's decision in McNally, every court of appeals to consider the question
had read the language of the wire and mail fraud statutes in the disjunctive; a conviction required
proof of either a scheme to defraud or a scheme for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses. See, e.g., United States. v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438, 440 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.
1989). Proof of a scheme to defraud did not require proof of actual loss of money or tangible
property. Id. at 441 n.3.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that:
It has been held that to prove an attempt to extort it is necessary to show an attempt to
arouse fear. The threats to Bryan, the breaking of the camera store window, and the assault
upon Eggers have all the earmarks of a design to instill fear in both men.
Obviously the extortion here involved was concerned with business accounts and with
unrealized profits from those accounts. Such intangible property has been held to be included
within those rights protected by the Act.
Id. at 343-44.
79. The Hobbs Act was passed in 1946 to curb labor racketeering that had been widespread
in the 1930s. See United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1976).
The Hobbs Act reads, in part, as follows:
Whoever in any way ... obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do,
or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined . . . or imprisoned. ...
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear. . ..
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2) (1988).
80. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
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Many abortion opponents believe that abortion is murder, and
some believe that they are doing God's will by trying to stop abortion.
Because they believe they are following a higher law,8' and because they
believe they are saving human life, some lawlessness is condoned by
antiabortion groups.82 One antiabortion leader explicitly approves of
trespass in demonstrations at abortion clinics. 3 Antiabortion demon-
strators also write letters to newspapers and publish circulars, newslet-
ters, and books stating their views. Leaders of the movement make
videotapes expressing their views. They also form organizations to pro-
mote the antiabortion cause. Opponents of abortion picket outside
abortion clinics; make speeches outside clinics; and engage in "sidewalk
counseling." Sidewalk counseling involves approaching patients of the
clinics (often women seeking abortions) offering information about
abortions and attempting to persuade them not to get an abortion. This
discussion can contain utterances that are offensive and obnoxious to
the patients.84 Phrases such as "please don't kill your baby today,"
make patients nervous and uncomfortable. Sidewalk counseling can be
delivered in a loud and harassing way at close proximity to the pa-
tient. 5 Antiabortion demonstrators also chant sayings at regular inter-
vals, chants that often can be heard inside the clinics. Demonstrators
may make offensive comments to clinic staff and demonstrators.
Demonstrators also make many hang-up calls, occupying the phone
lines and not allowing patients to contact the clinic.85 They have made
appointments at clinics to receive medical treatment with no intention
of receiving treatment, but rather to make the times unavailable for
legitimate patients.8 " Demonstrators block entrances and exits from
clinics and from clinic parking lots.88 Abortion foes have tried to deny
hospital privileges to doctors who perform abortions. They talk to land-
lords of clinics trying to persuade them not to rent to clinics. Abortion
activists trespass on clinic property,89 destroy or steal medical equip-
81. Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. & 2d Sess. 61, 63
(1987) [hereinafter Clinic Violence Hearings].
82. See id. at 66 (statement of Joseph Scheidler, Executive Director of the Pro-Life Action
League). Mr. Scheidler testified "when the laws allow the killing of innocent human beings, we will
change those laws. And until we change those laws, we will find ways to get around them." Id.
83. Id. at 61. Although trespass is condoned by Mr. Scheidler, other forms of lawlessness are
not. He testified that he tells his members, "Never touch anybody, never stop anybody, never
stand in front of anybody." Id.
84. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
87. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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ment from the clinic,90 and set clinics on fire and bomb them."
B. Protected Activities and Unprotected Activities
The Constitution protects peaceful assembly, even if members of
the assembly commit crimes in other contexts. 92 Assembly is an integral
part of the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment, and associa-
tion as part of that freedom also is protected.
Picketing is a protected first amendment right. This activity may
not be punished even when its purpose is to encourage others to take
action that is harmful to the target of the picketing.93 Marches and
demonstrations are quintessential first amendment activities. 4 Even
when state officials tell demonstrators that they have no right to
demonstrate on the grounds of the state capitol, and that it is unlawful
to do so, such activity is protected under the first amendment.9 5
Obnoxious and harassing speech is protected." Indeed, the Court
repeatedly has held that statutes which punish speech or conduct solely
because it is offensive or unseemly are constitutionally overbroad. 7 Co-
ercive speech also is protected. In Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe9" the Supreme Court held that the first amendment protected a
community organization which distributed handbills criticizing the bus-
iness practices of a real estate broker engaged in blockbusting.9 Simi-
larly, in NAACP v. Button'00 the Court overturned a Virginia state
90. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
93. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). But see Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (upholding a town ordinance prohibiting mass picketing at one particular house).
94. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
95. This activity is demonstrating in a public forum. Demonstrating on private property
lacks constitutional protection. Indeed, such demonstrating may violate the Constitution's guaran-
tees of privacy. Recently, demonstrations in quasi-public forums have been curtailed. See L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24 (2d ed. 1988).
96. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). The Supreme Court stated: "It is firmly
settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Id. at 592.
97. See, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
98. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
99. The Court specifically held:
In sustaining the injunction, however, the Appellate Court was apparently of the view that
petitioners' purpose in distributing their literature was not to inform the public, but to
"force" respondent to sign a no-solicitation agreement. The claim that the expressions were
intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of
the first amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by their
activities ....
Id. at 419.
100. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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statute that prohibited the solicitation of legal business, holding that
vigorous advocacy was a right guaranteed by the first amendment." 1
In summary, the antiabortion protestors say that they are engaged
in vigorous advocacy, protected by the first amendment. Some activities
plainly are not covered by the first amendment, no matter the expres-
sive political content of those acts. Acts of bombing and arson are not
protected. 102 Similarly, activities like hang-up calls and making false
appointments are not protected by the first amendment. 03 Trespass is
not constitutionally protected although it can be a powerful expressive
vehicle. 04 Trespass is often a public flouting of authority meant to show
that the trespasser is so fervent that he or she is willing to risk legal
sanctions. Is RICO properly applicable to the spectrum of demonstrator
activities? At one end of the spectrum is pure speech, to which RICO
cannot apply. At the other end is conduct unprotected by the first
amendment like bombing. 0 5 In the middle, there is mixed conduct.
This category includes both protected and unprotected conduct. Should
civil RICO apply to mixed conduct? The answer is no. Civil RICO
would chill protected speech.
VI. THREE EXAMPLES OF RICO AND ABORTION PROTESTORS
Private plaintiffs use RICO against defendants who are protesting
against plaintiffs' businesses. Thus far, the use of RICO against political
protestors has been mainly in the abortion area. Recently, however, an
expansion of RICO's use has occurred. Playboy and Penthouse
magazines have brought separate suits against the American Family As-
sociation, an antipornography group.0 6
A. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle
The abortion area, however, remains the most controversial. The
most completely litigated case is Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
101. The Court stated: "We meet at the outset the contention that 'solicitation' is wholly
outside the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment.. . . [A]bstract discussion is not
the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also
protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion." Id. at 429.
102. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
103. These activities have little of the expressive content traditionally at the center of the
first amendment.
104. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
106. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. American Family Ass'n of Fla., Inc., No. 89-2526 (D. Fla. filed
Nov. 14, 1989); Walden Book Company, Inc. v. American Family Ass'n of Fla., Inc., No. 89-2426
(D. Fla. filed Oct. 31, 1989). The suits are nearly identical. They charge the American Family
Association with federal and state extortion violations for threatening to label the magazines pub-
licly as obscene.
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McMonagle,0 7 which upheld the use of RICO against abortion protes-
tors. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs accused defendants of vio-
lating RICO by engaging in mail and wire fraud, extortion, and
robbery.10 8 The complaint named forty-two defendants.'09 At the close
of the three-week trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of
defendants on the Sherman Act charge, but sent the remaining RICO
trespass' 0 and intentional interference with contract claims"' to the
jury. The trial court found that patients and employees had been put in
107. 624 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (McMonagle 1), vacated and remanded, 813 F.2d 53
(3d Cir. 1987), on remand, 665 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (McMonagle 11); 670 F. Supp. 1300
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (McMonagle II1); 689 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (McMonagle IV), modified, 868
F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
108. Plaintiffs also alleged violation of the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act.
McMonagle 1, 624 F. Supp. at 738. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that a trespass on Aug. 10, 1985,
had resulted in thirteen acts of robbery, a crime punishable by imprisonment for over one year in
Pennsylvania, and therefore a RICO predicate act. Second, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had
engaged in a conspiracy to destroy plaintiffs' business by putting plaintiff, its employees, and pa-
tients in fear. In the plaintiff corporation's case, the fear was of economic injury from unlawfully
inducing plaintiff to curtail its business. Id.
Plaintiffs claimed that such conduct violated the Hobbs Act, another RICO predicate. Because
two predicates had been committed, robbery and Hobbs Act extortion, plaintiffs concluded that
defendants were participating or conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity in violation of RICO. Id.
109. Plaintiffs charged all 42 defendants with violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act. All 42 plaintiffs moved to dismiss the RICO claim under FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In October 1985 the Court denied the motions stating "it cannot be said that no set of
facts proven in relation to the plaintiff's complaint could result in liability for the defendants
under RICO, thus, the plaintiff's RICO count will not be dismissed." McMonagle I, 624 F. Supp. at
738. All 42 defendants had to go through the discovery process. Of these 42 defendants, 11 were
dismissed by plaintiffs shortly before and shortly after the start of the trial. See McMonagle II,
665 F. Supp. at 1150 n.1.
Thirty-one defendants went through the entire trial. At the end of the trial in May 1987, four
of the 31 defendants were granted a directed verdict because the only reasonable conclusion was
that these four defendants had not violated RICO. See id. The remaining 27 defendants were
found by the jury to have violated RICO. In March 1988 the court granted one defendant judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, because the evidence did not support the jury verdict finding
this sole defendant liable. See McMonagle IV, 689 F. Supp. at 476. Of the total of 42 defendants
named in the complaint, 15 were found to have been innocent of racketeering charges. See id. at
467. Stricter pleading requirements would have prevented the naming of many of these 15 as
defendants.
110. The four extortions alleged were robbery, extortion of the Center's right to do business,
extortion of employees' contract rights to employment, and extortion of patients' rights to receive
medical services from the Center. McMonagle III, 670 F. Supp. at 1303.
111. The court submitted plaintiff's RICO claim to the jury only with respect to those de-
fendants who had trespassed on at least one occasion (with the exception of Patricia Walton and
Linda Corbett) on the basis that all of the other activities in which petitioners had engaged were
protected by the first amendment and could not form the basis for civil RICO liability. Id. at 1309-
10. Four defendants who had engaged extensively in protest activities at the clinic but were found
not to have trespassed were dismissed from the case as to all claims, including RICO, regardless of
whether they had participated in the other activities that plaintiff claimed had comprised Hobbs
Act extortion. Id. at 1310. Thus, the gravamen of plaintiff's RICO claim was simply an action for
trespass.
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fear during the trespasses, and that this activity amounted to a cause of
action under RICO." 2
In McMonagle the jury found that twenty-seven defendants were
associated with or employed by an enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate commerce; that twenty-two defendants had personally com-
mitted at least two acts of extortion with respect to the clinic and its
employees and thus had violated RICO by conducting an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; and that five other defend-
ants had conspired with those found to have committed extortion of the
plaintiff corporation and extortion of the employees of the corpora-
tion.11 3 The jury did not find that the defendants had committed rob-
bery or that there had been extortion of patients.
The facts show that on four different occasions protestors tres-
passed on clinic property. After one of the trespasses, the court found
that "certain medical tubes, bottles, and knobs were missing."' 4 The
jury found that 887 dollars worth of equipment had been destroyed or
stolen as a result of this trespass and awarded that amount in damages
to the clinic on the RICO violation. 15
Defendants appealed to the Third Circuit on the grounds that civil
RICO should not apply to their activities. The Third Circuit rejected
the defendant's arguments."6 The Third Circuit did not take an inde-
pendent look at the record below as is traditional for appellate courts in
cases involving fundamental rights." Instead, it relied heavily on the
112. Id. at 1309.
113. See McMonagle IV, 689 F. Supp. at 467, 476. The 22 who were found to have violated
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) trespassed at least twice. The five who violated id. § 1962(d), had only
trespassed once and had blocked an entrance to the clinic. See Petition for Certiorari at 7, n.7,
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (McMonagle IV),
modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
114. McMonagle III, 670 F. Supp. at 1308.
115. This amount was trebled. Also, attorney's fees of $65,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs.
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 113, at 7.
Two defendants, Patricia Walton and Linda Corbett, had never been inside the clinic. Ms.
Walton had blocked the front door of the clinic, and Ms. Corbett had blocked the only open en-
trance to the parking lot. Ms. Corbett had also blocked the path of a doctor's car while the doctor
was trying to get to work. The court held that this evidence was sufficient to allow the extortion
claims against these two women to go to the jury. McMonagle III, 670 F. Supp at 1309 nn.13 & 14.
The jury found both women liable for extortionate activity. The court then granted Ms. Cor-
bett a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because no evidence was presented as to the existence
of any agreement whereby Ms. Corbett would conduct or participate in the activities of the enter-
prise through the commission of predicate offenses as defined under RICO. McMonagle IV, 689 F.
Supp. at 475.
116. McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d 1342, 1343 (3d Cir. 1989).
117. Id. at 1345. The Third Circuit gave too much deference to the trial court's opinion. It
did not make an independent evaluation of the record below. Such an independent evaluation is
standard for appellate courts in first amendment cases. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 285 (1964).
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Sedima admonition to look no further than the plain meaning of the
statute.11 Initially, the Third Circuit stated that civil RICO was being
applied in contexts far beyond those originally intended. Quoting
Sedima, however, the court stated that "this defect-if defect it is-is
inherent in the statute as written" and placed the burden of correction
on Congress. 19 The Third Circuit held that it was not free to read addi-
tional limits into RICO once a plaintiff has made out all of the elements
required for a finding of liability under the statute's explicit
provisions.120
118. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
119. McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499-500 (1985)).
120. Id. at 1348. The Third Circuit followed the methodology of statutory interpretation
used by the Supreme Court in Sedima, yet reliance on Sedima was inappropriate. Sedima is factu-
ally distinguishable from McMonagle in that the two corporations in Sedima were clearly eco-
nomic entities. The Third Circuit should have examined carefully the legislative history of RICO.
They would have found that Congress never intended for organizations that lacked an economic
purpose and that were engaged in patterns of activity which were not undertaken primarily for
economic reasons be subject to RICO. See supra Part II. Further, reliance on the command in
Sedima to read RICO as written stifles any true analysis. The Sedima command undermines any
opportunity to limit RICO judicially, to make RICO consistent with legislative intent. The Second
Circuit has construed properly the legislative history to limit the applicability of RICO to noncom-
mercial organizations and activities. See, e.g., United States v. Bagarac, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983); see also infra note 229. Compare this finding with
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), in which it looked
to the legislative history to circumscribe the reach of the mail fraud statute despite unanimous
Circuit Court precedent, with its refusal to look at legislative history in RICO.
In McNally the Court held that the mail fraud statute could not be used to secure intangible
property rights, because the legislative history of the statute showed an intent only to protect
property rights. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356. The Court was applying the rule of lenity, which is
commonly expressed as penal statutes must be strictly construed. One of the reasons for this strict
construction is said to be that criminals should be given fair warning, before they engage in a
course of conduct, as to what conduct is punishable and how severe is the punishment. The Court
was faced with the question of whether the mail fraud statute was limited to property rights or
covered intangible rights as well. The Court responded:
[Wihen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language ...
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and
involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for
local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights.
If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.
Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
Congress spoke on Oct. 21, 1988 with passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which
added a new section to the mail fraud chapter of the criminal code. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988)). The statute
provides that "[f]or purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1988). This law expressly overturned McNally and returned the law to its prior condition, namely
that loss of intangible rights was cognizable under the mail fraud statute.
The McMonagle opinion would make all ideological disputes involving protests, phone calls,
and letters crossing state lines subject to RICO civil and criminal penalties. Prosecutorial discre-
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The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that civil RICO was
inapplicable because the defendants' actions were motivated by politi-
cal beliefs: "Defendants' description of their conduct as 'civil disobedi-
ence' does not thereby immunize it.' 12' The court concluded that the
jury's award of damages under RICO was based on the destruction of
the plaintiff's medical equipment during one of the forcible entries and
established that the jury found the defendants' actions beyond mere
dissent or publication of their political views. 2
tion might be some bar to the filing of RICO criminal indictments. As discussed earlier, however,
the Department of Justice often has used the expanded mail fraud statute to file criminal com-
plaints against individuals who would not have been charged before. See supra note 75. The same
result could occur under a vastly expanded predicate of extortion. Especially troublesome would be
the possibility of prosecuting unpopular groups involved in demonstrations under RICO using the
extortion theories developed in McMonagle.
121. McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d at 1348. Citing cases like United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d
765 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983), in which bank robberies had been committed
to finance a religious organization, the Third Circuit concluded that the first amendment did not
shield from government scrutiny practices which imperil public safety, peace, or order. McMonagle
IV, 868 F.2d at 1348.
122. McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d at 1349. The facts in McMonagle are much different from the
facts in Dickens and other cases cited by the Third Circuit for the proposition that the first
amendment cannot serve as a sanctuary for law breakers. Dickens involved a gang of bank robbers
who used the proceeds of their 17 bank robberies to finance land purchases for their Black Muslim
religion. United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983), involved a defendant who kid-
napped a doctor and his wife at gunpoint, took money from them, and twice threatened to kill
them if the doctor did not stop performing abortions. The expressive content present in these two
cases is minimal. In McMonagle, by contrast, protestors had been involved for nine years in peace-
ful demonstrations outside the abortion clinic. The overwhelming amount of their time was spent
in protected activity.
Extortion is another example of a principle expanding beyond the scope of its logic. Consider
United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1972), in which a "civil rights activist" wanted a
business to hire a black employee. Mitchell threatened to picket, boycott, advertise against and sue
the company if his demand for the hiring of a black manager was not met. When a black employee
refused Mitchell's command to refuse to work, Mitchell warned the employee to arm himself.
Mitchell also demanded a $1000 payment from the business. Mitchell threatened to blackmail the
businesses' lawyers and managers and to kill those who did not follow his suggestions. Id. at 189.
Cases like Mitchell and United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 951 (1973), involve direct threats communicated to the subject. There was an overriding profit
motive and very little expressive content in the speech of the extorters. In McMonagle, however,
the remarks noted by the Third Circuit were not threats. They may have been predictions, or
wishful thinking, but they lacked the imperative quality present in Mitchell and Nadaline. Most
importantly, they lacked a profit motive.
In McMonagle the extortionate threats were remarks noted by the Third Circuit: "'I bet you
ten to one this place doesn't last six months,'" and "'It]his place is going to be shut down.'"
McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d at 1346. These remarks and the four trespasses were extortion of the
Center and its employees. The Court stated that "[t]he 'right' on which the Center's case was
predicated was the right to continue to operate its business. The Center's extortion claim was that
Defendants used force, threats of force, fear and violence in their efforts to force the Center out of
business." Id. at 1350.
Coercive and offensive speech is protected by the first amendment. Thus, a law that made it a
crime for a civil rights activist to say to a restaurant owner "if you don't desegregate this restau-
rant I am going to organize a boycott" would be overbroad and unconstitutional. See Wurtz v.
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Defendants also argued that the Center had not shown an injury to
business or property as required by RICO. The Third Circuit held that
the showing of injury to medical equipment during the trespass satis-
fied RICO, because the trespass was part of the pattern of extortionate
acts designed to drive it out of business.123
Finally, defendants contended that economic injury is an essential
element of extortion when it is used as a RICO predicate offense. They
argued that reliance on intangible rights was not enough. The court
ruled that the Center's right to continue to operate its business was a
property right. Further, the court found that defendants attempted and
conspired to extort (1) from the Center, its property interest in continu-
ing to provide abortion services; (2) from its employees, their property
interest in continuing employment; and (3) from patients, their prop-
erty interest in entering into contracts with the Center. 2 "
B. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts
In the recent abortion clinic protestor case, Feminist Women's
Health Center v. Roberts,2 5 the trial court followed the McMonagle
precedent faithfully. In July 1984 defendant Beseda was arrested for
setting fire to the plaintiff clinic on three occasions. The clinic closed
after the third fire. Beseda was tried and convicted in November 1984
and sentenced to a twenty-year prison term. In a civil RICO suit, the
clinic accused the defendants of aiding and abetting arson, and commit-
ting extortion, mail fraud, trespass, and violations of the Travel Act. 26
Taken together, these acts constituted conducting the affairs of an en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to vi-
olate RICO.
The clinic based the mail fraud count on defendant Roberts send-
ing out a leaflet that said the clinic did not have agreements with local
Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983). In McMonagle there was more than threatening
speech. Defendants each trespassed at least twice. The combination of coercive speech and tres-
pass produced Hobbs Act extortion and a violation of RICO.
123. McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d at 1349. The Third Circuit cited Malley-Duff & Assocs. v.
Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), affd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 143 (1987)
(holding that delay, added expenses, and inconvenience caused by defendants' interference with a
lawsuit satisfied the injury requirement under RICO).
124. McMonagle IV, 868 F.2d at 1350. The court erred in that it did not examine whether
legitimate protest would be chilled by the imposition of treble damages, attorney's fees, and the
label racketeer. The court did not examine whether those guilty of committing the predicate acts
were punished so severely that the punishment infringed upon first amendment guarantees. See
infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
125. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts (Roberts II), No. C86-1612 (W.D. Wash.
May 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts
(Roberts I), No. C86-161(V)D (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1988); see Roberts I, at 2-4.
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hospitals to treat medical emergencies. 127 The chief allegation of extor-
tion was that the defendants had formed a gauntlet outside the clinic
and forced patients and employees to walk through it. 2 ' The clinic also
accused the defendants of stealing aborted fetuses to use in a publicity
campaign, putting posters where people in the clinic could see them,
and blocking ingress and egress to the clinic. 2 9 The final count of extor-
tion was the allegation that defendants had made thousands of hang-up
calls to the clinic. 30
The court rejected defendants' arguments that a series of misde-
meanors like trespass and harassing phone calls should not be a RICO
predicate. Misdemeanors could constitute extortion.' 3 ' As in
McMonagle the right extorted was the intangible right of doing busi-
ness. The political or noneconomic motivation of the defendants was
irrelevant, as was the fact that the extorter gained nothing and the vic-
tim lost nothing.
The court also rejected an attempt to distinguish McMonagle. Ac-
cording to the court, the fact that there was no forcible entry or de-
struction of medical equipment did not distinguish the case legally from
McMonagle. The court refused the motion to dismiss and denied the
motion for summary judgment, holding "it is for the jury to decide,
based on these principles, whether the defendants' activities in fact
went beyond protected speech or conduct.' 1 32 The court held that the
clinic need only demonstrate that defendants caused them to part with
property through the use of fear, and that this deprivation adversely
affected interstate commerce.' 33
The jury found that only defendant Beseda was guilty of a viola-
tion of section 1962(c). It found that two defendants were innocent of
section 1962(c), but guilty of conspiracy under section 1962(d), and lia-
ble for 11,000 dollars for that conspiracy. The mail fraud count survived
two motions to dismiss, but subsequently was withdrawn. 3 4
127. Roberts I, at 21.
128. Id. In effect, the court directed the plaintiffs to plead their action with particularity.
Particularity of pleading is one of the RICO reform proposals presently under consideration by
Congress. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
129. Roberts I, at 20.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Roberts II, at 31.
133. Roberts I, at 20.
134. Roberts is important because it shows the potential for using conspiracy and mail fraud
against political protestors. One can be brought in as a coconspirator without having agreed per-
sonally to commit the predicate acts. See Comment, Clarifying RICO's Conspiracy Provision: Per-
sonal Commitment Not Required, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1399 (1988). It is sufficient if the agreement
contemplated that any member of the conspiracy would commit the predicate act. This conspiracy
rule would tend to make one careful of associating with others. Mail fraud could be accomplished
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C. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue
The Town of West Hartford filed a far-reaching RICO complaint
against demonstrators in June 1989.135 The town claimed that the de-
fendants had caused it to incur added expenses because of continued
demonstrations against abortion clinics. The town named as defendants
the entire leadership of Operation Rescue, some of whom never had
demonstrated in West Hartford. They were liable, according to the
town, because they had played an advisory role to the demonstrators.
The town named Operation Rescue and Randall Terry"'6 as defendants
even though Terry was not present at either protest in West Hartford.
The town claimed that Terry was liable under RICO because of his
publications, videotapes, and founding of Operation Rescue and other
organizations.13 7
Indeed, West Hartford claimed that Operation Rescue was the en-
terprise which functioned in a corrupt manner by trying to close abor-
tion clinics. 38 As part of the facts supporting their claims for relief, the
town cited every national convention of the antiabortion movement, as
well as books and speeches by its leaders. 3 9 Other defendants included
a group called Faithful and True Roman Catholics that had paid for a
newspaper advertisement claiming that a priest had been beaten at a
demonstration, that police officers were violent, and urging readers to
demand investigations. 40 According to the town, these statements were
deliberately, falsely, and maliciously uttered. The town also named a
newspaper publishing company as a defendant along with its editor and
an employee. The newspaper employees were alleged to have published
maliciously a defamatory account of the protest. 41
by recklessly omitting information that could do damage to another. If treble damages are imposed
for this behavior, people will be very careful not to say anything about businesses. Of course, Rob-
erts also clarifies extortion. If defendants cause a loss of property through the use of fear, RICO
applies if the pattern and interstate commerce elements are met.
135. See Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, H89-400PCD (D. Conn. 1989). An
amended complaint was filed on Sept. 22, 1989 [hereinafter Amended Complaint]. In the amended
complaint, the Summit Women's Center West, Inc. was a plaintiff along with the Town of West
Hartford. The Amended Complaint kept the parties and allegations cited in notes 136-41 infra,
and added allegations that Joseph Scheidler violated RICO through his publications.
136. Amended Complaint, supra note 135, 11. Randall Terry, one of the most prominent
antiabortion activists, is the founder of Operation Rescue, an organization that uses direct action
against abortion clinics.
137. Id. 3. Defendant Scheidler also was cited for one of his .publications, J. SCHEIDLER,
CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION (1985), in the Amended Complaint, supra note 135, 1 34-35,
which allegedly encouraged illegal methods to close abortion clinics.
138. Amended Complaint, supra note 135, 1 4.
139. Id. U 26-54.
140. Id. % 80.
141. Id. 1 66.
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VII. THE CHILLING EFFECT ON FREE SPEECH
A. The Transcendent Importance of the First Amendment
The most sacred of constitutional rights, protected by the Bill of
Rights, and of paramount importance in the minds of the drafters of
the Constitution, are those embodied in the first amendment-the
rights of free speech, of assembly, and of association. "Public-issue
picketing," specifically, occupies the highest rung in the hierarchy of
values protected by the first amendment.142 Freedom of speech is a
"transcendent" value. 143 It is "the matrix, the indispensable condition,
of nearly every other form of freedom. ' 144 The first amendment pro-
tects the freedom to petition and freedom of assembly as well as free
speech.1 -4 5 By implication, the freedom of association also is protected
by the first amendment. 4s
B. Theory
The rights protected by the first amendment are of profound im-
portance to our society. Free speech is a transcendent value in that
other values and rights are subordinated. In effecting the primacy of
the first amendment, the Court has developed the doctrine of chilling
effect, which recognizes that our legal system is imperfect and mandates
the formulation of legal rules that reflect our preference for errors made
in favor of free speech. 47
The degree of chilling will vary according to a number of factors,
and "may be likened to the product of the probability of an erroneous
verdict times the harm produced by such a verdict."'14 s The probability
of an erroneous verdict becomes greater as the legal concepts become
more complex.' 4e The second factor, magnitude of harm, is related
142. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
143. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
144. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
145. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
146. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981). The Court states that "the practice of persons sharing common views banding together
to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. . . . [B]y collec-
tive effort individuals can make their views known when, individually, their voices would be faint
or lost." Id. at 294; see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). "Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon
the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." Id. at 460.
147. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"
58 B.U.L. REv. 685 (1978). Schauer further states that "chilling effect may be seen not as the non-
conceptual generalization. . . but rather as a specific substantive doctrine lying at the very heart of
the first amendment." Id. at 688 (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 695.
149. Id.
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closely to the harshness of the penalty. Stigma is also important. If
there is injury to reputation, such as damage to social standing, then
the "magnitude of the potential harm is significantly increased, with a
proportionate increase in the degree of fear."'150 Litigation costs and the
specter of such expenses are also important in chilling speech. 151
The doctrine of chilling effect reflects the view that the harm
caused by the chilling of free speech is comparatively greater than the
harm resulting from the chilling of other activities. The logical mandate
of the chilling effect doctrine is that legal rules should be formulated to
allocate the risk of error away from the preferred value, thereby mini-
mizing the occurrence of the most harmful errors.'52
The doctrine of chilling effect was applied in Speiser v. Randall'
which involved a property tax preference for veterans, available to
those who signed a form that stated they belonged to no organization
that advocated violent overthrow of the government. The Court ruled
that the statute was invalid because it impinged on speech.
[Tihe line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legit-
imately be regulated ... is finely drawn. The separation of legitimate from illegiti-
mate speech calls for more sensitive tools than California has supplied.. . . There
is always in litigation a margin or error, representing error in fact finding, which
both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is
reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of pro-
ducing a sufficiency of proof...
* . [W]here particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and
the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in all litiga-
tion-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. The
man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawful-
ness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone .... This
is especially to be feared when the complexity of the proofs and the generality of
the standards applied, provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must main-
tain his position."'
C. RICO and Chilling Effect
Because of treble damages, other significant sanctions, and the ease
with which it is applied to fact situations far removed from organized
crime, civil RICO has become the weapon of choice for the private liti-
150. Id. at 697.
151. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subse-
quent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 266
(1982).
152. Schauer, supra note 147, at 705.
153. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
154. Id. at 525-26 (citations omitted). RICO fits this description perfectly. Because of the
statute's great complexity, the reach of predicate acts like extortion and mail fraud make RICO
applicable to many different kinds of behavior. The imposition of RICO's harsh penalties rests on
plaintiffs' desire to invoke the statute.
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gator and a way to chill first amendment rights. The mere threat of
treble damages and being labeled a racketeer can intimidate defendants
into settlement in nonmeritorious suits. As Justice Thurgood Marshall
wrote in dissent in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.: "Many a prudent
defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case
with no merit. . . . [C]ivil RICO has been used for extortive purposes,
giving rise to the very evils that it was designed to combat. '155 This
intimidation may occur not only in ordinary commercial litigation, but
also in disputes involving ideological beliefs. Use of RICO against advo-
cacy organizations chills the individuals who might join the organiza-
tions but are afraid of being sued under RICO. It also hurts the
political advocacy organizations and chills first amendment rights of in-
dividuals who are already members.
The instant a complaint is filed, the adverse party is labeled a rack-
eteer under the statute. This labeling is harmful to an organization that
already may be espousing views not shared by the entire community.
The prohibitive cost of litigation alone may be enough to cause a group
to cease what should be protected first amendment behavior. Intrusive
discovery proceedings, which may prove particularly damaging to politi-
cal advocacy groups, soon follow. 156
Civil RICO can allow the criminal acts of one person to cause inno-
cent organizations and individuals with which the criminal is associated
in lawful activity to be brought into a RICO suit.157 Facile pleading re-
quirements readily subject an organization or individuals, with little re-
lation to the predicate acts or enterprise, to the threat of federal treble
155. 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. For example, in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465, 470
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (McMonagle IV), modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261
(1989), the court allowed the plaintiffs to discover the fundrasing, expenditure, and corporate
record of the Pro-Life Coalition of Southeast Pennsylvania, which was not a party to the action.
The court also allowed discovery as to fundraising, expenditure, and corporate records of any other
antiabortion organizations to which defendant McMonagle belonged. Plaintiffs successfully intro-
duced the Pro-Life Coalition's evidence as minutes of the Board of Directors meetings. Id.
In Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, H89-400PCD (D. Conn. 1989), the town is
trying to collect treble damages and costs from someone who advocated action against abortion,
and associated himself with other people who were antiabortion to try and effectuate their political
agenda. By naming Randall Terry and organizations he founded as defendants, plaintiffs can en-
gage in discovery of Mr. Terry's associational ties and the finances and membership lists, and even
minutes of the organizations named. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. These discov-
ery proceedings in and of themselves chill first amendment rights. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
157. For example, in Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), three defendants were accused of RICO
violations. One admitted to bombing the abortion clinic. The other two were protestors who had
been associated with the bomber while he was engaged in lawful activity. The two protestors were
held liable for conspiracy to violate RICO, even though the jury cleared them of the substantive
charges against them. Id. at 28-30.
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damages.158
A judgment is not necessary to affect adversely the civil RICO de-
fendant. On the contrary, bringing the suit often accomplishes the ob-
jective of threatening an ideological opponent. The mere onset of
litigation can provide a serious affront to first amendment privileges.
Indeed, plaintiffs intolerant of a group's opinions may file suit, realizing
that their allegations will be very difficult to prove, with the sole inten-
tion of inhibiting the activities that they consider to be an imposi-
tion.159 Our system cannot tolerate such casual use of the courts to
achieve political ends through litigation, especially when these ends are
not grounded in legitimate allegations.6 0
While courts should sanction the group or individuals responsible
for the criminal activities, this goal must not be allowed to impugn the
associational rights of related parties. Liberal pleading requirements al-
low a plaintiff to include a loosely associated array of defendants in a
RICO claim. Under RICO's expansive provisions and vague language,
plaintiffs can survive a motion to dismiss, even on strained allega-
tions. '6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 does not protect against the
158. In McMonagle 42 defendants were named and 16 were dismissed. McMonagle IV, 868
F.2d at 1345 n.2.
159. In West Hartford allegations were made concerning prominent antiabortion leaders who
had not been present at the demonstration. See Amended Complaint, supra note 135, 11 34-37.
160. RICO is especially dangerous because so much depends on enterprise and pattern, con-
cepts that focus on associations between individuals. The conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1988), is also dangerous for the same reason. The liberal pleading and discovery rules can allow
plaintiffs to name as defendants people who may not have committed predicate acts but who are
prominent opponents of the plaintiffs. As a possible example of this phenomenon, see West Hart-
ford's Post Hearing Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Application For A Preliminary Injunc-
tion Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, H89-400 PCD (D. Conn. 1989), which reads, in
part, "As to the defendants Joseph Scheidler and Maria D. Garvey, it is conceded that the plaintiff
has, thus far, proffered no evidence of their involvement. Nevertheless, the plaintiff continues to
assert their involvement in the enterprise, and will continue to pursue the present action against
them." Id. at 37. Mr. Scheidler is president of one of the most prominent antiabortion groups.
161. In Roberts, for example, one defendant was sued under a mail fraud predicate because
she had circulated a newsletter saying that the clinics had no emergency treatment agreements
with hospitals. 1988 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 16,325, at 21 (Mar. 11, 1988). The District Court refused
defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 25. The District Court twice held that the mail fraud allega-
tion stated a RICO cause of action before being withdrawn by plaintiffs. Id. Thus, as a matter of
law, plaintiffs could have recovered for the statement made by Roberts in the newsletter that the
clinics had no back up emergency agreements with local hospitals. This result is a clear and basic
impingement of the first amendment commitment to free and robust debate on public issues. Even
if this statement ultimately would be held to be covered by the first amendment, and thus that no
liability could attach, the fact that it survived two summary judgment motions underscores the
breadth of RICO.
When a defendant moves to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), he faces formidable obsta-
cles. A complaint will not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, "factual allegations of
the complaint are to be accepted as true," and "[r]easonable factual inferences will be drawn to aid
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use of RICO in these circumstances. 16 2 With enterprise and pattern of
racketeering activity defined loosely, liberal pleading requirements, im-
plication by association, the specter of treble damages, costly defense,
intrusive discovery, and the racketeer label, civil RICO threatens first
amendment rights.
D. Methods of Preventing Chilling Effect
The Supreme Court has formulated rules to guard against chilling
first amendment rights. Generally, these rules can be categorized as
precision of regulation and void for vagueness. In NAACP v. Button16 3
the Court used both vagueness and precision of regulation language to
guard against chilling effect by striking down a Virginia statute making
solicitation of legal business a crime."" The Court noted that standards
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
expression.6 5
the pleader." D.P. Enter. v. Bucks County Community College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).
Under these standards, it is difficult for a defendant to prevail at this stage. If a defendant is a
member of a political advocacy organization, some of whose members are alleged to have engaged
in RICO predicate acts, mere membership in the association might be enough to enable plaintiff to
survive a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6).
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, which requires that attorneys sign only those pleadings that they
believe in good faith to be true, is supposed to guard against frivolous lawsuits. Rule 11, however,
is inadequate protection for civil liberties that are threatened by RICO. Rule 11 is useful in impos-
ing sanctions on lawyers who have flagrant misrepresentations in their complaints. See, e.g., Rubin
v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff falsely alleged Hong Kong citizenship to establish
diversity of citizenship with a New Jersey defendant and revealed the misrepresentation only after
the defendant won the summary judgment motion). Rule 11 also has been used to sanction attor-
neys who have "not done their homework" in preparing a complaint. See, e.g., Albright v. Upjohn
Co. 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff sued Upjohn because drug products she was using
caused stains to her teeth but Upjohn did not manufacture the products she had used). Rule 11,
however, does not provide enough protection to people who could, because of their associational
ties, be named in a RICO complaint even though they have not committed any RICO predicate
acts. The pleading with particularity provision in the proposed legislation would help ameliorate
this injustice. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. Lawyers would have to stop and think
before naming someone as a RICO defendant and would have to be able to allege specific facts
about each defendant's involvement in the predicate offenses.
163. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
164. Id. at 438. The Court stated that "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." Id.
165. Id. at 432. Specifically, the Court held:
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair
notice to a criminally accused ...but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First
Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application. These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.
Id. at 432-33 (footnote & citations omitted).
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In New York Times v. Sullivan16 the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of a state libel law "against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' 167 The Court struck
down the Alabama libel law that was based on a negligence standard
because such a standard, when applied to comments about public offi-
cials, would chill speech. The Court stated that "[a] rule compelling the
critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual asser-
tions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in
amount-leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' ,68 The Court con-
cluded that the constitutional guarantees required a rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
unless the official proves that the statement was made with actual
malice.16 9
1. Precision of Regulation
Precision of regulation is a method for protecting against chilling of
first amendment freedoms. This method requires that when both pro-
tected and nonprotected conduct occur (mixed conduct), the nonpro-
tected conduct and those engaged in it be carefully separated from
those engaged in protected first amendment activity. In borderline
cases, in which it is difficult to tell whether the activity or the actor is
protected, the Court will extend first amendment protection to the ac-
tivity. The actor will not be held liable.
a. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
The controlling case is NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.' 7° The
case involved a boycott of white merchants by black residents of Clai-
borne County, Mississippi, meant to force civil rights changes in the
county. The boycott had elements of pure speech, of other activities
protected by the first amendment, and of violence.17 1 Violent acts were
committed against some blacks who did not honor the boycott. Shots
were fired at homes, windshields were broken, real property was dam-
aged, personal property was taken, and people were beaten. 72 There
were also threats of violence. 173 The first amendment, however, does not
166. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
167. Id. at 270.
168. Id. at 279.
169. Id. at 279-80.
170. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
171. Id. at 916.
172. Id. at 904.
173. Id. at 906.
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protect violence or the threat of violence."
The Court held that only those defendants who had participated in
violence could be held liable for business losses, and they could be held
liable for only those damages that were proximately caused by their vio-
lent acts. The Court found that coercive speech does not lose its pro-
tected character simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them
into action.1 " Because speech to protest racial discrimination is politi-
cal speech lying at the core of the first amendment, the Claiborne Court
held that the first amendment protected the nonviolent elements of the
activities engaged in by the black citizens of Claiborne County.16
The first amendment does not prohibit a state from imposing tort
liability for business losses that are caused by violence and by threats of
violence. 77 When violence and threats of violence occur in the context
of constitutionally protected activity, however, "precision of regulation"
is demanded.17  The presence of activity protected by the first amend-
ment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to liability
and on the persons who may be held accountable for damages. 79 The
Claiborne Court turned to the grounds that give rise to damages liabil-
ity by discussing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.180 The Court held that
in cases involving first amendment activities, only damages for the con-
sequences of violent conduct could be imposed.
The Claiborne Court also held that the first amendment restricted
the States' ability to impose liability on individuals solely because of
association. Reviewing its decisions in the area of association, the Court
found:
174. "'Certainly violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the use of weapons,
gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the guise of "advocacy.""' Id.
at 916 (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglass, J., concurring)).
175. "[S]o long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of
acceptability." Id. at 911 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971)). The Claiborne Hardware Court also cited Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Noerr involved the question of whether the Sherman Act
prohibited railroads from entering into anticompetitive acts against the trucking industry. The
railroads had engaged in a publicity campaign designed to result in the adoption of laws destruc-
tive to the trucking industry and to impair the relationships between truckers and their customers.
The truckers had suffered injury as a result of the publicity campaign. Nevertheless, the Noerr
Court held that the railroad's publicity campaign was protected by the first amendment, despite
the Sherman Act prohibitions against anticompetitive activity. Id. at 144-45.
176. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915.
177. Id. at 916.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 916-17.
180. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In this labor-management dispute, violence and threats of violence
occurred, followed by nine months of peaceful picketing. Limiting the union's liability, the Court
held that "the permissible scope of state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct
consequences of such [violent] conduct, and does not include consequences resulting from associ-
ated peaceful picketing or other union activity." Id. at 729.
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Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a
group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to be im-
posed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to fur-
ther those illegal aims. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ "means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved."'181
The Claiborne Court concluded that those individuals who committed
the violent acts were liable for the damages proximately caused by
those acts.182 Precision of regulation demanded that only those who
committed the violent acts be held liable for the amount of damages
caused by their violent acts.
b. RICO and Precision of Regulation
In McMonagle it is clear that those individuals who trespassed and
caused damage are liable for those damages. The twelve protestors who
trespassed and damaged medical equipment in August 1985 in the
amount of 887 dollars were liable for that amount. The right to exclude
others is a fundamental element of private property ownership, and the
first amendment does not create a right to trespass on private prop-
erty.8 " Indeed, the question is settled in the general area of abortion
clinic protests and the specific facts involving the Northeast Women's
Center.184
The protestors in McMonagle were held to have violated RICO by
engaging in extortion. Trespass is not a predicate offense, but extortion
is. Trespass, however, was the method used to delineate the defendants
that violated RICO. This reasoning is the only way that the Claiborne
Hardware test could be met. The test is that for liability to be imposed
by reason of association alone, it must be established that the group
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific
intent to further those illegal aims. 8 5
181. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920 (footnote omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). This holding was violated in McMonagle, in which all those who held the
goal of trespass were said to hold the goal of extortion. See Northeast Women's Center Inc. v.
McMonagle, 370 F. Supp. 1300, 1308-09 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (McMonagle III), modified, 868 F.2d 1342
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 261 (1989).
182. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 921-23.
183. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972).
184. In Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F. Supp. 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1989), a federal district
court was faced with a trespass of the Northeast Women's Center that occurred two months after
the August 1985 trespass in McMonagle. The court cited a dozen holdings stating that antiabor-
tion protestors do not have the right to express their views on the private grounds of medical
clinics. Id. at 1165 n.7. Indeed, the district court in McMonagle had made the same holding. See
McMonagle II, 665 F. Supp. at 1160.
185. The Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict given to Linda Corbett, a defendant in
MeMonagle, shows that this standard is the rule. McMonagle IV, at 475-76. The judge set aside
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In McMonagle RICO resulted in an 887 dollar judgment turning
into a nearly 68,000 dollar judgment. Twelve trespassed when some-
body damaged property. Only those demonstrators who were involved
in violent activities should have been held liable for the damages proxi-
mately caused. The use of RICO destroyed the careful attempts of Clai-
borne Hardware to protect the first amendment in mixed conduct
situations. The group of defendants liable was expanded. Only twelve
caused damages, but fourteen others were held liable because they tres-
passed. In effect, the Court found all trespassers guilty of extortion.
Second, Claiborne Hardware's precision of regulation rule is vio-
lated in the amount of damages for which defendants are liable. RICO
mandatorily trebles damages and awards attorney's fees, which are oth-
erwise unavailable."8 6 Thus, defendants who legitimately were liable for
887 dollars were held liable for nearly 68,000 dollars because of RICO.
Such a result is untenable and chills first amendment rights.187
c. New York Times v. Sullivan and Other Libel Cases
In a series of libel cases the Supreme Court has regulated precisely
the amount of damages available under libel laws. The Court has held
that enhanced damages must be closely scrutinized, especially when
they arise in the context of protected activity. In these cases, the Court
has considered the limitations upon state libel laws imposed by the con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. It has held that tortious
activity may be accorded special exemption if the regulation would im-
pinge on first amendment rights. New York Times v. Sullivan88 is the
seminal case. A group seeking financial support for the civil rights
movement had paid for an advertisement in the Times. The statement
contained allegations of police misconduct. The plaintiff was in charge
of police at the time the incidents related in the advertisement oc-
curred. He proved that some of the statements were inaccurate and was
awarded a judgment under Alabama state law against the Times. 8 ' The
the jury's decision because no evidence existed which showed that Corbet had trespassed. The
judge further held that to hold Corbett liable would impinge on her first amendment rights. Id. at
476. The court's reasoning must have been that those who trespassed had illegal purposes and that
those who trespassed had specific intention to further the association's illegal goals. Therefore, the
association could be held liable.
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
187. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974); see also infra notes 188-
200 and accompanying text (discussing New York Times v. Sullivan and other libel cases). De-
fendants in McMonagle also were held liable on the state law claim of trespass. See infra notes 221
and accompanying text. This Article does not examine that holding.
188. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
189. Id. at 256-62. Prior to 1964, the law of defamation was not viewed as falling within the
ambit of the first amendment and was primarily left to state law. Emphasizing the "profound
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Supreme Court held that a public figure could not recover for negli-
gently false statements made about him. To recover the public official
had to prove that the statement was made with actual malice, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false.
1 9 0
The advertisement normally enjoyed first amendment protection
because it was expression about an important public issue, and the
question was whether it forfeited that protection by the falsity of some
of its statements. The Court was concerned that the effect of such a
rule would be to deter critics of official conduct from criticizing because
of doubt whether their statements "[could] be proved in court[,] or fear
of the expense of having to do so." ''  Because holding newspapers liable
for negligently false statements would dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate, a result inconsistent with the first amendment,
the Court adopted the maliciously false standard.192 It is important to
note that the Court could have relied on precedent that libel enjoyed no
constitutional protection and allowed the Alabama holding. Instead, the
Court held that the first amendment and freedom of expression are to
have the "'breathing space that they need to survive.' ,,a
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.' the Court allowed private defa-
mation plaintiffs to prevail on a less demanding showing than actual
malice, "in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.' 95 Such a
plaintiff could recover only such damages as are sufficient to compen-
sate for actual injury.196 The Court, however, limited the damages on
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," the Supreme Court extended first amendment coverage to defamation concerning
the conduct of public officials. Id. at 270.
190. Id. at 279-80. The Court reached this decision in the face of strenuous arguments well
founded in precedent, that the Constitution does not protect libelous statements. The Court said
that "libel" was a "mere" label of state law like
insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation
of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have
been challenged in this Court, [thus] libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitu-
tional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
Id. at 269 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. at 279.
192. Id. at 279-80.
193. Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). In Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court extended the actual malice standard from public
officials to public figures. In Gertz the Court further refined the concept by creating categories of
all purpose public figures and limited purpose public figures. 418 U.S. at 323.
194. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
195. Id. at 348-49.
196. Id. at 349.
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first amendment grounds. 97 The attempt to reconcile state law with a
competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the first
amendment made it appropriate to require that state remedies for de-
famatory falsehood reach no further than necessary to protect the legit-
imate interest involved. 198 Because it feared the chilling effect such a
rule would produce, the Court held that when public officials were con-
cerned, only damages from libelous statements maliciously made would
be recoverable. Therefore, even when the speech involved was entitled
to less protection, when malice need not be shown to recover, the
amount of damages still was limited to actual damages.1 9 Gertz recog-
nizes that "the alleged deterrence achieved by punitive damages awards
is likely outweighed by the costs-such as the encouragement of unnec-
essary litigation and the chilling of desirable conduct. 2 0 0
197. The Court stated:
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation with-
out any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries
to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system
of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment free-
doms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular
opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a
false fact .... States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs ...gratuitous
awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury.
Id. at 349.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 350. The Gertz holding with respect to damages exceeding actual damage has
been extended to other areas of the law. In the labor area, an award of punitive damages was given
to a union member, who claimed that his union was liable for unfair representation because it had
missed a filing deadline. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). The
Court reversed the award of punitive damages for several reasons. First, the financial danger of
punitive damages could imperil the very existence of unions. Second, punitive damages could be
employed to punish unpopular defendants. Third, the prospect of punitive damages might "chill"
unions. The Court specifically stated:
In order to protect against a future punitive award of unforeseeable magnitude, unions might
feel compelled to process frivolous claims or resist fair settlements. Indeed, even those unions
confident that most juries would hold in their favor could be deterred by the possibility of
punitive damages from taking actions clearly in the interest of union members.
Id. at 52. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), punitive damages against
a municipality for the actions of its employees were disallowed because they "may create a serious
risk to the financial integrity of these governmental entities." Id. at 270.
200. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), allowed punitive damages, absent a showing of
actual malice, in a matter involving a credit report. The report did not involve a matter of public
concern and was entitled to less stringent protection under the first amendment. Id. at 759. There
are some situations in which the nature and context of defamation have allowed the Court to apply
a lower standard. Thus, publication of credit ratings that were recklessly but not maliciously false
were held to allow punitive damages. Id. at 763. For example, statements by protestors to licensing
authorities about a doctor who performs abortions not involving matters of public concern could
be subject to the Dun & Bradstreet rule.
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2. Void for Vagueness
In addition to precision of regulation, the Court also has used the
void for vagueness doctrine to invalidate laws that impinge on the first
amendment while protecting against harmful conduct. Due process re-
quires that laws be reasonably definite as to persons and conduct within
their scope.20 1 In determining whether a law is void for vagueness, the
following inquiries are appropriate: (1) Does the law give fair notice to
those persons potentially subject to it? (2) Does the law adequately
guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement? (3) Does the
law provide sufficient breathing space for first amendment rights?2"2
The classic formulation of the notice requirement is found in Connally
v. General Construction Co.20 The Connally Court held that a statute
violates the first essential of due process of law if it either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. 204 A law that provides a rule of conduct in unambiguous,
understandable terms also will be voided for vagueness if it lends itself
to arbitrary enforcement. For example, in Kolender v. Lawson205 the
California law being challenged was a requirement, written in clear
terms, that a citizen provide identification to a police officer. 206 The
Court voided for vagueness not because of notice but because of the
possibility of arbitrary enforcement, specifically that the law might be
used against undesirables at the sole and unreviewable discretion of po-
lice officers. 0 7
Vagueness doctrine has a special resonance in the first amendment
area.2 8 In the seminal commentary on vagueness, Professor Tony Am-
sterdam argues that vagueness doctrine is used "almost invariably for
the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the pe-
201. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 90-92 (2d ed. 1986).
202. Id. at 92.
203. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
204. Id. at 391.
205. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
206. The statute stipulated that police could arrest any person
[w]ho loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or
business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested
by any peace officer to do so, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a
reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.
Id. at 353 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970)).
207. See id. at 357-61. See generally Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985).
208. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (stating that "stricter standards of permis-
sible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on
speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of
ideas may be the loser").
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ripheries of several of the Bill Of Rights freedoms,"20 9 most promi-
nently the first amendment.
RICO should fit into that category of laws that have been held void
for vagueness for lack of ascertainable standards to guide those who
implement them. Anyone who participates in the affairs of an enter-
prise2 10 by means of a vaguely defined pattern of racketeering211 is
guilty of a RICO violation. Violation of RICO carries with it greatly
enhanced criminal penalties. These penalties are available to prosecu-
tors and plaintiffs whenever they choose to use them. These penalties
chill first amendment rights.212 Professor Gerard Lynch testified before
Congress that "The one pervasive problem in RICO is that the vague-
ness of its terms make extremely serious penalties available virtually
whenever prosecutors choose to invoke them, without the identification
of genuine aggravating circumstances justifying the more serious
penalties."21 3
RICO, however, already has survived challenges that it is void for
vagueness. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana214 challenged the use of
the obscenity predicate on vagueness grounds. Defendant argued that
the definition of enterprise was vague. Justice Byron White, writing for
the majority, stated that if the underlying obscenity law was not vague,
then RICO was not vague.215 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for
himself, Justice William Brennan, and Justice Thurgood Marshall,
pointed out that RICO was not the same as obscenity because RICO
also used the statutory term "pattern." Use of "pattern" compounded
the "intractable vagueness" of obscenity.216
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for himself, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy in a concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.,217 noted that litigation over pattern in RICO has led to the
greatest split among the circuits in history. According to Justice Scalia,
because the majority opinion in H.J. Inc. did not lead to greater clarity,
209. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67,
75 (1960) (authored by Anthony G. Amsterdam); see also Jeffries, supra note 207, at 216-17.
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). "'[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." Id.
211. Basically the commission of two crimes over ten years. See id. § 1961(5).
212. RICO also may provide insufficient notice, thereby violating all three of the basic rules
to determine vagueness. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
213. H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 52 (statement of Prof. Gerard E. Lynch).
214. See 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
215. Id. at 925.
216. Id. at 934 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. See 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2906 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Vagueness had not
been argued by the defendants in H.J. Inc.
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a strong possibility exists that RICO could be held void for vague-
ness.218 Thus, seven members of the Court substantially question
RICO's constitutionality with regard to its vagueness.
VIII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The kind of behavior engaged in by the twenty-six defendants
found liable in McMonagle should not be punishable by the extraordi-
nary sanctions found in RICO. Congress did not have this kind of activ-
ity in mind when it passed RICO in 1970. It is wrong to have a federal
treble damages statute that applies to political advocates who engage in
generally peaceful conduct. Some protestors did trespass, and there was
some damage to medical equipment. The wrongdoers responsible for
these acts should be punished under state civil and possibly state crimi-
nal law. To use, however, a punitive and sweeping federal statute
against this behavior is an abuse of RICO and the legal process.
Other protestors also use direct action. 19 With the precedent es-
tablished by McMonagle, RICO now can be applied to antinuclear
protestors, antiapartheid protestors, and animal rights protestors who
occasionally have acted in the same way as the abortion clinic protes-
tors did in McMonagle. They trespass and damage property. Histori-
cally, many anti-Vietnam war protests would have been actionable
under RICO. Undoubtedly, many universities and arms manufacturers
could have claimed that they and their employees had been put in fear
by antiwar protests. This type of extortion would have resulted in
treble damages and costs being assessed against the protestors. Simi-
larly, civil rights protestors could be sued under RICO by cities and
towns that had to pay additional money to policemen as a result of
these protests. Use of RICO-because of trebled damages and the rack-
eteer label-unnecessarily would have chilled expressive and associa-
tional conduct. State remedies are adequate to protect against this kind
218. Id. at 2909.
219. Direct action tactics have been used by other groups besides abortion protestors. See
Feder, Pressuring Perdue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, § 6, at 32, col. 1 (describing the animal
rights movement's use of direct action tactics).
Antinuclear demonstrators have attacked nuclear plants because they perceive an imminent
threat to public health and safety. In State v. Warshow, protestors prevented workers from
entering a plant that was shut down for repairs. In Commonwealth v. Berrigan, the Berrigan
brothers entered a nuclear plant and caused over $28,000 worth of damage to missile compo-
nents. Environmental and animal-rights groups have also organized direct intervention cam-
paigns. See Environmental Militancy is Alive and Thriving in the U.S., Christian Science
Monitor, Oct. 21, 1988, at 3 (National section); Four Sentenced to Jail for Animal Protest,
U.P.I. BC Cycle, Oct. 8, 1986 (members of Animal Rights Direct Action Coalition claim to be
the first animal rights activists arrested for civil disobedience).
Id. (citations omitted); see also Note, supra note 23, at 664 n.15 (cataloging different groups and
their uses of direct action protests).
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of illegality.2 0 The use of mail and wire fraud, while not as fully devel-
oped in the political protest context, is potentially more harmful. Any
false statement that hurts business or property could lead to a RICO
lawsuit.
IX. PROPOSALS BEFORE CONGRESS FOR RICO REFORM
Senator Dennis DeConcini and Representative Rick Boucher have
introduced bills that correct some of the deficiencies in existing RICO
law.22' The proposed changes include stricter pleading requirements,
narrowing of the availability of treble damages by requiring conviction
in certain instances of underlying predicate activity, changing the level
of proof from preponderance to clear and convincing with regard to pu-
nitive damages, and elimination of the pejorative term racketeer.222 The
reform bill will curb some of the first amendment abuses engendered in
current RICO law while preserving its ability to carry out its intended
purpose, namely the eradication of organized crime's infiltration of le-
gitimate business. The reform bill would discourage the filing of
groundless suits by circumscribing the situations under which a legiti-
mate action may be'brought.
An amendment to RICO's liberal pleading requirement is crucial.
The proposed legislation would require a plaintiff, seeking redress
under RICO, to aver with particularity the facts that support the plain-
tiff's claim against each defendant named in the action. The reform bill
would require that all RICO predicate acts be plead with particularity.
The extraordinary remedies available under RICO, the need to protect
a defendant's reputation, and the prevention of politically motivated
suits all justify this stricter pleading requirement.2
In suits brought by private litigants, the reform bill would require a
conviction of an underlying unlawful activity in order to obtain treble
damages. Under the bill, a plaintiff suing several defendants could only
obtain automatic treble damages against the particular defendant con-
victed of a predicate offense. Without such a measure, defendants are
subject to severe remedies for criminal acts without the procedural pro-
tections afforded by criminal law, nor its heightened burden of proof.
220. For example, in Northeast Women's Center Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1347 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989), the jury award for trespass was $42,974.95.
221. Representative Rick Boucher introduced H.R. 1046 in the House. H.R. 1046, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Senator Dennis DeConcini introduced S. 438 in the Senate. S. 438, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S1653 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989). These bills were identical when
introduced. The analysis will focus on the Senate reform bill.
222. See S. 438, supra note 221. The Senate reform bill requires pleading with particularity.
See S. 438, supra note 222, at § 8, 135 CONG. REc. at S1654; see also H.R. 1046, supra note 221.
223. See S. 438, supra note 221, § 4(c)(8), 135 CONG. REc. at S1654; see also supra note 159
and accompanying text.
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This provision grants needed protection against the drastic remedy of
treble damages.224
Additionally, a litigant seeking punitive damages against an uncon-
victed defendant first must meet certain statutory conditions. One of
these conditions is that the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant's actions were consciously malicious, or so
egregious and deliberate that malice may be implied. 25
To alleviate the stigmatization suffered by the party against whom
a RICO action is brought, the reform bill changes the term "racketeer"
and variants thereof to "unlawful activity." This practice, however, is
allowed only in complaints that do not allege a crime of violence.226
The reform bill attempts to prohibit RICO suits that are based on
facts like those in McMonagle.27 This addition would improve present
RICO law but leaves some problems unresolved. For example, some
persons would characterize McMonagle as a violent case. Further, it is
unclear whether mail fraud allegations like those made in Roberts
would be exempt from reformed RICO.
Although the reform bill is a good beginning in reforming RICO, it
is not enough. For more complete protection, it is necessary to exempt
all noneconomic activity from RICO. 228 This task could be accom-
plished by adoption of a primary economic purpose test for xacketeer-
ing activity. The deterrence of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees
is not appropriate for noneconomic organizations and activities.229
224. See S. 438, supra note 221, § 4(c)(5), 135 CONG. REc. at S1654; see also supra notes 170-
76 and accompanying text.
225. See S. 438, supra note 221, § 4(c)(3)(D), 135 CONG. REc. at S1654; see also supra notes
188-93 and accompanying text.
226. See S. 438, supra note 221, § 4(c)(10), 135 CONG. REC. at S1654; see also supra note 142
and accompanying text.
227. Section 1962 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by adding the following at
the end thereof:
"(e) For purposes of this chapter, the term 'racketeering activity' shall not include participa-
tion in, or the organization or support of, any non-violent demonstration, assembly, protest,
rally or similar form of public speech undertaken for reasons other than economic or commer-
cial gain or advantage, and no action may be maintained under this chapter based on such
activities."
S. 438, supra note 221, § 3(c) (amended version).
228. This exemption should apply to noneconomic as defined in Note, supra note 23, at 669
n. 47.
229. Courts have recognized this concept in holding that noneconomic crimes should not be
cognizable under RICO. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit
relied on the legislative history of § 1962(d) in holding that "when an indictment does not charge
that an enterprise or the predicate acts have any financial purpose, it does not state a crime under
§ 1962(c)." Id. at 65. Not only is the term "enterprise" used in subsections (a) and (b) to refer to
the "sort of entity in which funds can be invested and a property interest of some sort acquired,
and hence the sort of entity which one joins to make money," id. at 60, but Senator McClellan
himself, "the principal sponsor of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, [has] made clear on
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One solution would be to add a new subsection (e) to United States
Code section 1962. This subsection would stipulate that "[to show a
violation of this section, plaintiffs must prove that either the enterprise
or the pattern of racketeering activity had an economic or profit-mak-
ing purpose."
Such language would correct the finding in McMonagle. Considera-
ble legislative history supports the proposition that only commercial en-
tities or activities were intended to be covered.230 The term "pattern of
racketeering activity" appears in the new subsection to ensure that non-
profit entities which engage in economic crimes still would be
covered." 1
In its RICO law, the State of Washington has a provision requiring
that the "pattern" be for financial gain.23 2 The language of the Wash-
ington statute defines "criminal profiteering" as any act "committed for
financial gain. '23 3 Thus, inserting similar language into the federal defi-
nition of racketeering activity would lessen substantially the civil liber-
ties misapplications of RICO. Political groups that engage in predicate
acts would not be shielded. For example, an environmental group that
several occasions that the purpose of Title IX is 'economic' and that the only crimes included in §
1961(1) are those adapted to 'commercial exploitation.'" Id. at 63; see also 116 CONG. REC. 18,940
(1970) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan); McClellan, supra note 3, at 161-62. The defendants
in Ivic were charged with participating in an enterprise that used "'terror, assassination, bomb-
ings, and violence in order to foster and promote their beliefs and in order to eradicate and injure
persons whom they perceived as in opposition to their beliefs.'" Ivic, 700 F.2d at 58 (quoting Ivic
Indictment Count 1, 2). Because, however, no charges were made of any economically motivated
activities, the judgment against the enterprise under RICO was dismissed. Id. at 65.
See also United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
Although Bagaric was factually very similar to Ivic in that it involved a terrorist enterprise
charged with murder, bombings, and related crimes, an important fact distinguishes the cases. In
Bagaric, unlike in Ivic, the "core of the enterprise was the commission of more than fifty acts of
the classic economic crime of extortion ... [that] were carried out either to compel payment or in
retaliation for refusal to meet appellants' extortionate demands." Id. at 57-58. The defendants sent
letters to wealthy Croatians demanding the payment of between $5000 and $20,000 and warned
that if payment was not made reprisals would soon follow. The money was to be used in preparing
for the violent overthrow of the Belgrade government. Id. at 48-49. Only because this particular
terrorist enterprise had an underlying economic core did the Bagaric court find the defendants
liable under civil RICO. For a case involving similar facts, see Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,
818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989) (holding that conduct under
RICO must have a harmful effect on the economy of the United States).
230. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 42 (involving an extortion scheme whereby a Croatian
nationalist group could obtain money to further its political objectives). Under the proposed RICO
reforms, members of the group would be covered. Even though the nationalist group did not have
a profit making purpose, the pattern of racketeering activity in which they engaged-obtaining
money through force or the threat of force-did have a profit making purpose.
232. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(14) (Supp. 1989). California also has this require-
ment. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2 (West 1988).
233. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(14) (Supp. 1989).
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committed bank robberies to finance its political activities still would
be subject to RICO.
A requirement that RICO allegations be plead with particularity
also must be included. Even if all political organizations were exempt
from RICO, there would be danger that liberal pleading would allow
plaintiffs to name as defendants innocent people who were associated
with those who had committed predicate acts.
X. CONCLUSION
There is a pressing need for the prompt reform of civil RICO. Con-
gress passed RICO to ameliorate the pervasive effects of organized
crime upon society. It was drafted broadly to enable society to reach
mobsters who are notoriously well insulated from the normal processes
of criminal justice. Civil RICO was meant to help stop infiltration of
legitimate businesses by organized crime. Civil RICO was not meant to
reach noneconomic defendants.
RICO has strayed from its intended goal and become a dangerous
tool, sometimes employed in derogation of first amendment rights. Al-
though the intended target was organized crime, the language of RICO
is functional, not status oriented. Because organized crime does any-
thing to make money, the list of predicate acts was long and since has
been expanded by Congress. Extortion and mail and wire fraud are
predicates that cover the loss of intangible rights. The right to do busi-
ness is an intangible right. Ideological protestors inevitably cause busi-
nesses delay and inconvenience and thus interfere with the right to do
business. These losses are cognizable under RICO, and plaintiffs have
begun using RICO against protestors.
RICO's structure facilitates its use for such a purpose. The statute
focuses on associations. The key statutory terms, "enterprise," "pat-
tern," and "racketeering activity" all allow a plaintiff to inquire into a
defendant's associational history and activity. RICO allows plaintiffs to
name various defendants as members of an enterprise, even when these
defendants have little to do with substantive wrongdoing. RICO's dra-
conian penalties are not used only in cases of outrageous or heinous
conduct. Indeed, RICO's harsh penalties are invoked at the whim of the
plaintiff, as long as the increasingly expansive statutory conditions are
met.
It is wrong to use RICO against protestors. The stigma of being
labeled a racketeer and the threat of treble damages and attorney's fees
make RICO an ideal tool for chilling speech. RICO is a complex statute
incorporating hundreds of federal and state laws in its definition of
racketeering activity. In defining RICO's own statutory terms, like pat-
tern, the Supreme Court has encountered substantial difficulty.
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RICO is used increasingly in ideological disputes. Using RICO in
this way is a perversion of the original congressional intent. It is also
unwise on policy grounds. First amendment rights are of paramount im-
portance. When other rights conflict with the first amendment, the
Court traditionally has overcompensated to protect first amendment
rights. The doctrines of chilling effect, void for vagueness, and precision
of regulation are all methods that the Court has used to create breath-
ing space to allow first amendment rights to survive. Recent statutory
interpretations by the Supreme Court make it unlikely that the Court
will read RICO consistently with original congressional intent. The
remedy for this defect lies with Congress. The reform proposal before
Congress is a significant step toward resolving RICO's misapplication to
political protestors. Congress should amend RICO to ensure that
protestors never again face treble damages, attorney's fees, and the
racketeer label for engaging in activity from which they will not profit
economically.
